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This study examined Scottish Highlanders who defended the southern border of British 
territory in the North American theater of the War of the Austrian Succession (1739-1748). A 
framework was established to show how Highlanders were deployed by the English between 
1745 and 1815 as a way of eradicating radical Jacobite elements from the Scottish Highlands and 
utilizing their supposed natural superiority in combat. The case study of these Highlanders who 
fought in Georgia and Florida demonstrated that the English were already employing 
Highlanders in a similar fashion in North America during the 1730s and 1740s.  
British government sources and correspondence of colonial officials and military officers 
were used to find the common Highlander’s reactions to fighting on this particular frontier of the 
Empire. It was discovered that by reading against what these officials wrote and said was the 
voice of the Highlander found, in addition to confirming a period of misrepresentation of 
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There can be no mistaking the integral role Scotland has played in the British armed 
services. Scots contributed significantly – whether in manpower for the army or building 
valuable ports for the Royal Navy – to the military of Great Britain. Historians who have written 
on this subject generally concur that the impact of Scots in the British armed forces was 
beneficial and seen in many ways, including the solidification of relations between the nations of 
Great Britain. By fighting a common enemy together, i.e., France, it was thought that the Scots, 
in particular the Highlanders, lost their Jacobite tendencies (which France supported) and 
became fully integrated into the British nation. However, when one looks back at the primary 
source material available from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a somewhat different 
picture begins to appear. While the complete inclusion of all of Scotland into the British military 
did have a positive effect for Great Britain, the actual experiences of Scottish soldiers tell a 
different story.  
Reviewing the military history of Great Britain from this period shows how the English 
took advantage of the new pool of manpower found in Scotland after the ’Forty-Five in their 
campaigns against their old enemy, France. Britons may not have completely come together and 
fought a common enemy, as some historians claimed. Scottish Highlanders were coerced into 
service of Great Britain through conscious means by the English for the expansion and 
consolidation of the British Empire. The Highlanders who colonized Georgia in the 1730s were 
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part of the martial misappropriation that occurred throughout the eighteenth century in the 
British military in part due to the stereotypical notion of the Highlander as suited for the military 




 In the years leading up to parliamentary union, the relationship between Scotland and 
England was tense at best.1 Since the Union of Crowns in 1603, there was much debate on how 
each country could better from the other. Scotland wanted more share in foreign matters, 
particularly trade in newly-acquired territory.2 James VI and I, the first ruler of a united Scotland 
and England under one monarchy, even desired to politically unite the two countries under one 
government, each country being equally represented in one parliament.3 The English, however, 
were not as keen to allow more Scottish involvement in imperial matters, and abhorred the idea 
of complete union between the two nations.4  
With the triumph of William of Orange (William III) over the House of Stuart and his 
ascendance to the throne, there was a sharp increase in mutual hatred and distrust between 
Scotland and England.5 However, according to Christopher Whatley and Derek Patrick, the 
foundation for parliamentary union in 1707 was laid two decades before when Scottish 
                                                 
1 Murray G. H. Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 28; Christopher A. 
Whatley and Derek J. Patrick, The Scots and the Union (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 3. 
2 T. C. Smout, “Introduction,” in Anglo-Scottish Relations from 1603-1900: Proceedings of The British Academy, 
vol. 127, ed. T. C. Smout (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 3; Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 56-
58.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Whatley and Patrick, The Scots and the Union, 4-5. 
5 Ibid., 3. 
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politicians began talks with William of Orange concerning the new king’s ascension to the 
Scottish throne in 1688.6 The English resented these negotiations, and continued to dominate the 
discourse on who had more control in the monarchial union of Scotland and England.7 The 
English saw the Scottish Parliament as a body that could not govern its own people, particularly 
the threat posed by Jacobites who desired to restore the Stuart dynasty. Scots wanted a union but 
only if both countries were able to participate fairly in the new government, where Scotland 
would not be “reduced…to the position of a mere satellite.”8 Yet Scotland persisted in 
attempting to form a political union throughout the troublesome decade of the 1690s when 
Scotland was continually made a lesser partner in matters at home and abroad.9 
Anti-Scottish and Anti-English rhetoric increased in the eighteenth century. More 
prevalent throughout this century was English xenophobia of Scotland, where Scots were 
portrayed as “vermin-like” and barbarous in their manners and lifestyle.10 Even the Gaelic 
language, spoken by as much as one quarter of the population of Scotland at the turn of the 
eighteenth century, and other Scots dialects were ridiculed by the English in their attempts to 
alienate the Scots.11 Much of the distrust of the Scots in general was focused on those who 
supported the restoration of the House of Stuart, currently residing in exile in Catholic France, a 
traditional rival of England and close supporters of the Jacobite cause outside the British Isles. 12  
The desire of the Jacobites to see the Stuarts once again on the throne, a divine right in itself 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 5. 
7 Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 26-29, 58. 
8 Smout, “Introduction,” 3-4. 
9 Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 26; Whatley and Patrick, The Scots and the Union, 5. 
10 Paul Langford, “South Britons’ Reception of North Britons, 1707-1820,” in Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1603-1900: 
Proceedings of The British Academy, vol. 127, ed. T.C. Smout (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 153, 158; 
Whatley and Patrick, The Scots and the Union, 1. 
11 Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 45; Langford, “South Britons’ Reception of North Britons,” 164-165, 
168; Whatley and Patrick, The Scots and the Union, 12-13. 
12 Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 56. 
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according to Jacobite rhetoric, added to a growing English stereotypical view of the Jacobites as 
backward and militaristic, longing for the chance to restore the Stuarts by force if necessary.13 
The issue of rule by divine right played perfectly into the anti-Catholic and anti-Episcopalian 
propaganda promulgated by the Protestant English after the Glorious Revolution. 
The Jacobite cause was backed largely by an increasingly-isolated Episcopalian 
population once Presbyterianism returned with the victory of William of Orange after the Battle 
of the Boyne in 1690.14 This shift caused many Episcopalians to feel estranged from the rest of 
the Scottish population, including the process of becoming more involved in political activity.15 
This caused many Episcopalians to distrust any union with an English population that saw them 
as enemies of the state, demonstrated in the destruction of Episcopalian churches and meeting 
houses.16 The influence of more pro-government Presbyterianism and the Church of England 
ostracized the Episcopalian community by associating them with Catholics, and as consorting 
with France for a possible invasion of England and restoration of the Stuart dynasty.17  
In the years between William of Orange’s accession to the English and Scottish throne 
and full political union in 1707, Scotland and its image suffered tremendously from English 
attempts to position itself in a position of dominance over Scotland in the monarchial union.18 
Yet both countries had significant attributes the other desired.19 Even William III desired a union 
                                                 
13 Daniel Szechi, 1715: The Great Jacobite Rebellion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 255-256; Whatley 
and Patrick, The Scots and the Union, 2-3. 
14 Whatley and Patrick, The Scots and the Union, 3. 
15 Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 27. 
16 Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 44; John L. Roberts, The Jacobite Wars: Scotland and the Military 
Campaigns of 1715 and 1745 (Edinburgh: Polygon at Edinburgh, 2002), 3. 
17 Ibid., 104. Pittock asserts that Scottish Presbyterians, while initially associated with Jacobitism, moved farther 
away as Episcopalians became more associated with the Jacobite movement. 
18 Ibid., 27. 
19 Smout, “Introduction,” in Anglo-Scottish Relations, 5-6. 
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of parliaments, a cause taken up by his successor, Queen Anne, in 1702.20 A political union was 
seen as a way to stem the rising threat of French-supported Jacobitism in England and 
Scotland.21 There was a good support base in Scotland for union, but certain acts passed by the 
English Parliament, such as the Act of Settlement of 1701 where any future monarch must be 
Protestant and adhere to the Church of England, and the Alien Act of 1705 that would have made 
Scots foreigners according to the English, hindered progress to such a union.22 Riots broke out in 
towns and cities in Scotland in protest of parliamentary union and English intimidation of the 
Scots prior to and after the establishment of a British Parliament in May 1707.23 In light of these 
events, the Scottish Parliament was dissolved and both England and Scotland were ruled under 
one governing body with the Act of Union of 1707. 
T.C. Smout argues that “parliamentary union did little in the short run for Anglo-Scottish 
relations,” and the Scots themselves received little benefit, save for elite in both countries.24 
Despite the afore-mentioned reaction to union in Scotland, the Scots appeared to have accepted 
the new government better than the English.25 There was still a deep mistrust of Scots, 
particularly those with Jacobite sympathies that all Scots were thought to have. While not all 
Scots harbored nostalgic feelings of a triumphal return of the Stuarts, it was thought they did, and 
the English sought to eradicate this wherever possible, whether by pro-Hanoverian propaganda 
                                                 
20 Whatley and Patrick, The Scots and the Union, 4. 
21 Smout, “Introduction,” in Anglo-Scottish Relations, 4; Whatley and Patrick, The Scots and the Union, 1. 
22 Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 30-31; Roberts, The Jacobite Wars, 6; Whatley and Patrick, The Scots 
and the Union, 6. 
23 Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 32; Roberts, The Jacobite Wars, 8; Whatley and Patrick, The Scots and 
the Union, 11. 
24 Smout, “Introduction,” in Anglo-Scottish Relations, 4; Langford, “South Britons’ Reception of North Britons,” in 
Anglo-Scottish Relations, 143. 
25 Smout, “Introduction,” in Anglo-Scottish Relations, 5. 
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or by armed struggle.26 In reaction to this, Jacobites residing within Great Britain, including 
those in the Scottish Highlands, began to partake in militant resistance to what they saw as 
foreign domination of their country. 
 Between 1713 and 1715, Scottish Ministers of Parliament led a failed petition for more 
inclusion of Scotland into some of the politics of the British Parliament.27 This, coupled with 
other attempts at altering, if not dismantling, the political ties between Scotland and England, led 
to the out break of the first large-scale Jacobite rebellion in 1715, known as the ’Fifteen.28 The 
’Fifteen was intended to bring together those throughout Scotland disaffected by the new British 
Parliament, and not exclusively those who wanted a return of the Stuarts.29 Despite the attempts 
of claiming the rebellion would rightfully place a true British monarch to the throne (as opposed 
to the Germanic House of Hanover), the Jacobites did not find the support they needed to remove 
the Hanoverians.30 A lack of strong central leadership and poor military planning broke up the 
parties associated with the Jacobite cause, and the rebellion was suppressed that same year.  
After the ’Fifteen, the British government passed several acts aimed at eliminating the 
factors with which the Jacobites were able to form, such as the enactment of measures to disarm 
the Highland population.31 In the Scottish Highlands, there was much animosity amongst the 
population who supported the ’Fifteen for the British government, yet this disaffection appeared 
to wane after the 1720s; two decades later, Scots who had supported the Jacobites were seen 
                                                 
26 Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 32, 58, 104.  
27 Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 32. Roberts, The Jacobite Wars, 16-17. 
28 Roberts, The Jacobite Wars, 18-19; Szechi, 1715, 2, 5, 251. 
29 Goeffrey Plank, Rebellion and Savagery: The Jacobite Rising of 1745 and the British Empire (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 17. Plank argues that while many Scottish Highlanders took up arms in 
support of the ’Fifteen, the Jacobite army was not entirely composed of them, a stereotypical image developed after 
the ’Fifteen and repeated in the ’Forty-Five. 
30 Roberts, The Jacobite Wars, 48-58; Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, 17. 
31 Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, 18. Plank points out that while these measures were somewhat effective, they 
were not properly enforced. 
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celebrating the birthday of King George II.32 However, as Christopher Whatley and Derek 
Patrick argue, one must be aware that this show of loyalty to the Hanoverians and the British 
Parliament was not entirely inclusive of all Highlanders; not be until after the last Jacobite 
rebellion, the ’Forty-Five, that the Union would be more secure.33 
When Charles Edward Stuart, grandson of James VII and II, called for an overthrow of 
the Hanoverians, he believed his family were the only legitimate heirs to the British throne, and 
was set on restoring a true British monarchial dynasty for all of Britain.34 In late July 1745, 
Charles Edward landed in Scotland and, with his Jacobite army, began fighting Government 
forces as the Jacobites moved south into northern England.35 Despite victories against 
Government troops and Scots loyal to the Hanoverians, the Jacobite army fell back into Scotland, 
and in April 1746 were massacred at Culloden Moor.36 It was at Culloden that Government 
forces were awed by the mass charge of the Jacobites, further solidifying the assumed notion of 
the Scots Gaels as tenacious warriors suited for frontier warfare in the unstable British colonies. 
After the collapse of the Jacobite movement, the British government put into effect severe 
reprisals to eradicate the radical Jacobite movement from the Highlands, which included the 
banning of cultural objects used by the Highlanders (e.g., bagpipe, kilt), disarmament of clan 
militias, and removal of Gaelic from common usage. These measures were felt at all levels of 
society in the Scottish Highlands and carried out to ensure that there would be no future threat 
emanating from northern Britain.37 
                                                 
32 Whatley and Patrick, The Scots and the Union, 368-369. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, 3. 
35 Ibid., 1. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Roberts, The Jacobite Wars, 183-188; Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, 1. 
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In the decade after the ’Forty-Five, Parliament passed legislation banning the Scottish 
Highlanders from owning weapons, wearing tartans, playing traditional Highland music, and 
owning land.38 The enforcing of these laws was taken up early on by Government troops, who, 
driven by a “widespread antagonism” of the Scots Gaels, were determined that no rebellion of 
that scale happen again.39 The Scottish Highlands, stereotypically regarded as a tinderbox of 
seditious rebellious activity after the ’Fifteen and more so after the ’Forty-Five, were seen as a 
backward part of Great Britain, marked by the afore-mentioned cultural elements of its Gaelic-
speaking inhabitants.40 The process of “Anglicizing” the Highlands to become integrated into the 
larger British state involved the suppression of the supposed violent tendencies of the Highland 
population, accomplished in one way by recruiting Highlanders for policing duties.41 
Unfortunately for the Highlanders, militant Jacobitism became associated with the Scottish 
Highlands due to a misconception that Highlanders made up a vast majority of the Jacobite 
forces during the uprisings of the early and mid-eighteenth century. 
By the 1750s, and particularly so during the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763), military 
service for Highland men presented a excellent opportunity for the British government to 
stabilize the rebellious regions in Scotland, while providing an outlet for the Scots Gaels’ 
                                                 
38 Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, 6. 
39 Ibid., 3-4, 6. 
40 Ibid., 3-4, 8. 
41 Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 109; Langford, “South Britons’ Reception of North Britons, 1707-1820,” 
162; Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, 10-21. According to Plank, the utilization of the Highland independent 
companies to patrol the Highlands “connect[ed] them, politically and economically, to the wider British world.” 
These independent companies also participated in road-building projects, designed to connect the Scottish Highlands 
with the rest of Great Britain and facilitating the process of assimilation. It should not be forgotten that armed 
insurrection was, as Murray Pittock claimed, “an extreme manifestation of Jacobitism rather than a normative one,” 
and that this stereotypical image of the Jacobite-sympathizing Scottish Highlander was a construct of eighteenth-
century propaganda by the English as a means of civilizing Scottish Gaeldom by recruiting Highland men on a large 
scale for military service abroad. See also, Robert Clyde, From Rebel to Hero: The Image of the Highlander, 1745-
1830 (East Linton, Scotland: Tuckwell Press, Ltd. 1995). 
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supposed inherent martial capabilities.42 Scots, specifically Highlanders, were in high demand 
for military service in the numerous conflicts and conquests of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. The period 1740 to 1815 saw British forces engaged in wars on a global scale. The end 
of the ’Forty-Five and the implementation of plans to incorporate the Scottish Highlands into 
Great Britain presented the English with a new source of manpower for martial needs. While 
there were Highlanders employed by the Hanoverian dynasty before the end of the ’Forty-Five, 
such as Forty-Second Regiment of Foot (The Black Watch), many Highlanders did not serve in 
the British army until the Seven Years’ War. This war, in addition to the American War of 
Independence, the Napoleonic wars, the War of 1812, and the defense of British colonies, 
particularly in the Americas, featured significant numbers of Highland soldiers. During these 
wars, Scotsmen, Highland and Lowland, made up a significant portion of the British army, 
despite being a minority within Great Britain.43  
The same is applicable to what transpired on the border between Spanish Florida and the 
colony of Georgia earlier in the eighteenth century. Throughout the North American theater of 
the War of the Austrian Succession (1739-1748), known as the War of Jenkins’ Ear, there were 
bitter border disputes between the newly-established British colony of Georgia and Spanish 
Florida. Each side claimed territory in Georgia acquired after previous conflicts. The British 
continued to spread their influence over more North American territory, and Georgia was 
selected for, among other things, the establishment of a strong defensive border on the southern 
frontier of British possessions. In doing so, the settlers, most of them Highlanders, were thrust 
                                                 
42 Roberts, The Jacobite Wars, 191-192; Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, 21. 
43 Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 266-268; T. M. Devine, Scotland’s Empire and the Shaping of the Americas 1600-1815 
(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Books, 2003), 313-316. 
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into an often-times intense guerilla war with the Spanish and their Native American allies. 
Colonel William Stephens, secretary for the Board of Trustees of Georgia, described the 
loathsome experience of frontier warfare seen by many Highlanders on a daily basis, noting that 
“the labouring man no sooner sets his foot [in Georgia]” than he finds himself “entering in some 
Branch or other of Military Service.”44 The Georgia provincial units, principally the Highland 
Rangers and the Highland Independent Company, were raised specifically for conducting raids, 
countering unconventional warfare tactics practiced by the Spanish and their allies, and 
maintaining a constant vigil on the frontier.45 Those selected to patrol the borders found it 
difficult to accomplish due to instances of poor weaponry, inclement weather, and inefficient 
supply.46 The description of the fighting in this region is similar to the style of warfare abhorred 
by one of Britain’s most famous commanders, General James Wolfe. Wolfe, a British officer 
who served with Government forces during the ’Forty-Five and would later become one of the 
more famous generals during the French and Indian War, detested frontier service as “the most 
insignificant and unpleasant branch of military operations,” with all who served in a “perpetual 
danger of assassination.”47 Contemporary comments such as these show the true sentiment of 
British military personnel in regards to military service on hostile frontiers during this period. It 
was this type of frontier warfare that many of the Highland colonists in Georgia faced while 
defending the southern border of British North America between 1736 and 1748. 
                                                 
44 William Stephens to Harman Verelst, January 20, 1743, in Allan D. Candler, et. al., ed., The Colonial Records of 
the State of Georgia (hereafter identified as CRSG), vol. 24, Original Papers, Correspondence, Trustees, General 
Oglethorpe, Others, 1742-1745 (Atlanta: Chas. P. Byrd State Printer, 1915), 207. 
45 Ivers, British Drums on the Southern Frontier, 197. 
46 Ibid., 196. 





The period 1740 to 1815 was an important time in Anglo-Scottish relations, one of the 
major factors being the suppression of Jacobitism and the total inclusion of the Scottish 
Highlands into Great Britain. The domination of the Scottish Highlands allowed for the British 
government to employ men from the Highlands for military service on a scale previously unseen. 
One of the main foci of this thesis is a case study on the martial experience of Highlanders 
serving in Georgia and Florida in the mid-eighteenth century. An analysis of the experiences of 
Highlanders who fought the Spanish in Georgia and Florida, defending British possessions, will 
build a case for the nascent inquiries into possible martial misuse of Scottish Highlanders by 
examining their deployment against Spanish and Spanish-allied forces during the early years of 
the War of Jenkins’ Ear and further verify the analyses of historians who demonstrated how 
future Highland regiments in the British Army were used in the conflicts that involved Great 
Britain in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, as well as provide a new military history 
to this subject along the lines of what John Shy saw as necessary in placing military history in 
the realm of historical scholarship.  
In a lecture before the American Historical Association in January 2008, John Shy put 
forth a call for military historians, who are on the periphery of historical scholarship, to enter into 
debate with non-military historians who have written on military history subjects.48 Shy argues 
that studies of warfare by non-military historians have the potential to be improved if these 
                                                 
48 John Shy, “History and the History of War,” The Journal of Military History 72, 4 (October 2008): 1033-1046. 
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historians work with scholars who specialize in studying military history. This thesis is an 
attempt to reconcile the “gulf” that has developed between military and other academic 
historians to enhance the research on these subjects.49 Shy’s concept will be part of the analytical 
framework developed throughout this thesis. 
What is missing from the historiography is a critical analysis of how the British 
government martially employed Scottish Highlanders. This thesis, then, explores the two types 
of possible exploitation of Scottish Highlanders by the English. The first type examines the 
Highlander as employed in the British army in large numbers in order to stabilize the country and 
remove any threat to the government and monarchy. The second type analyzes the 
misconceptions amongst English military commanders who, through their own praise of the 
Highland soldiers on the battlefield, subconsciously accepted the idea of the Scottish 
Highlanders as inherently natural warriors, when in reality this was not the case. The issue of 
misappropriation of Scottish Highlanders for the expansion and consolidation of the British 
Empire has briefly appeared in the secondary literature; there is no comprehensive study arguing 
a systematic pattern of such. There are, however, studies on other minority groups from imperial 
territories exploited by the English for martial reasons.50 These studies provide crucial 
methodological frameworks in order to demonstrate how minorities within the British Isles were 
exploited. The Highlanders fall into this particular category of martial misapplication in part due 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 1034. In his address, John Shy argues: “Military historians…are sure that those colleagues [academic 
historians who do not specialize in military history] regard courses and books on military history as not much better 
than a form of entertainment, ever popular with students and the general public, but lacking the qualities that foster 
serious critical thinking and genuine understanding of the past.”  A “gulf” developed in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries between military historians and those that wanted to “broaden and deepen historical inquiry,” 
leaving the study of warfare in history to certain specialists. 
50 See, Carina A. Montgomery, “The Gurkhas and Colonial Knowledge: Habitat, Masculinity, and the Making of a 
‘Martial Race,’ c. 1760-1830” (Master’s thesis, University of Calgary, 1998). 
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to a stereotypical “martial race” identity applied to the Highlanders by the English. Historians 
have debated the impact of Scotland in the British military and the impact military service had on 
Scotland, with arguments made for both positive and negative results. There is a noticeable shift 
away from analyzing the positive aspects and a focus on bringing out the true nature of the 
Highland soldier’s employment in the British armed forces, in some cases negative, and 
demonstrating the value of Scotland in securing the British Empire.  
The thoughts and comments of the average Scottish soldier serving in the army from 
1740 to 1815 are difficult to ascertain. There is a significant lack of primary source material from 
Highland soldiers who served in the British army during this time. Many Highland soldiers were 
illiterate or could only converse in Gaelic. The exploits of these Highlanders, however, were 
recorded by government officials and high-ranking military personnel. Sources such as court-
martial records, battle reports, and casualty lists will be used in order to understand how the 
Highland soldier reacted to service in the British armed forces during this period.  
What is important to establish in this research is to what extent were Highlanders 
misrepresented by the English in the British military. The first chapter of this thesis will be a 
survey of the historiography on the martial history of Scottish Highland service in the British 
armed forces during the mid-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. As mentioned above, part 
of the framework of this thesis will conform to John Shy’s call for more academic military 
history studies that will amend the division between military and non-military studies. This thesis 
will expand upon the ideas put forth in the works of Larry Ivers and Anthony Parker, prominent 
scholars on colonial Georgia and involvement in the War of Jenkins’ Ear, and tie the experiences 
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of the Scottish Highlanders in Georgia to that of the broader issue of how Scottish Highlanders 
became integrated into the British armed services from 1740 to 1815.  
The second chapter will be dedicated to a general overview of Highland martial 
experiences from 1745 to 1815 to provide answers to some of the questions posed above. This 
chapter will examine the attitudes of government officials and high-ranking officers on the 
employment of Highland soldiers in the British army. Their opinions are important because these 
officials and officers actively recruited the Highlanders for military service. By establishing that 
there was a pattern of misemployment by the English during this period, one will understand 
how the ordeals of the Highlanders who fought on the southern frontier of British territory in 
North America fit into this paradigm of service in the British military. An analysis of British 
government records, specifically documents from Parliament between the 1730s and 1750s, 
demonstrates that certain policies were in place to allow for such practices to occur. From the 
perspectives of these elites in British society it becomes clear that the English used lucrative 
incentives to persuade high-ranking Scots to actively drain the Highlands (and in some cases, 
Lowland areas) of men for service.  
The third chapter will be devoted to the case study of the martial exploits of the 
Highlanders who defended the southern border of British territory in North America during the 
1730s and 1740s. Having established a framework in Chapter Two that shows Highlanders were 
exploited by the English between 1745 and 1815, the case study in Chapter Three will 
demonstrate that the English were already employing Highlanders in a similar fashion on the 
southern frontier of North America. It is here that the common soldier’s views will be most 
important. However, as mentioned above, these sources are difficult to locate. Government 
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sources and correspondence of colonial officials and military officers will be used to understand 
the conflicts that took place between the British and Spanish in the 1730s and 1740s, as well as a 
way of finding the common Highland soldier and his reactions to fighting on this particular 
frontier of the Empire. 
The fourth chapter of this thesis will evaluate how Highlanders who fought in Georgia 
and Florida in the 1730s and 1740s fit a general pattern of misrepresentation by the English. The 
purpose here is to develop a framework for future analysis into the theme of the utilization of 
Scottish manpower in the British armed services. This conclusion will demonstrate the necessity 
of further inquiry into this topic. Altogether, this will show how the English exploited the Scots, 
specifically the Highlanders, for the expansion and defense of the Empire. This in turn opens up 
new venues of interpretation into this area of research. By establishing the existence of 
manipulative practices towards the Highlanders in the British army will the possibility exist for a 
proper examination of how Scots were exploited in the Royal Navy. This thesis it is not a 
complete study of the Highland experience during the period in question. Only with further 
research on later periods in Britain’s military experience and the inclusion of Gaelic sources will 
the true experience of Highlanders and Lowlanders, and the extent to which they were exploited 
by the English, become known. 
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CHAPTER 1:  HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 
The historiography of this subject has undergone several developments since the first 
published studies in the early decades of the nineteenth century. One of the first major studies on 
Scots in the British armed forces was completed by David Stewart of Garth in Sketches of the 
Character, Manners, and Present State of the Highlanders of Scotland.51 While it served a 
purpose as a valuable collection of histories of Highland regiments, including sections on dress, 
music, and behavior, twentieth-century scholars rejected the text as inaccurate, arguing the book 
is tainted with Romantic-era descriptions that distort the reality of Highland service in the British 
army. The rejection of Stewart’s work allowed for more complex arguments to develop, 
specifically on topics such as why Scots took up arms in service of Great Britain, post-’Forty-
Five Rebellion recruitment in the Highlands, and the overall contribution of Scots in defense of 
the burgeoning Empire. 
The 400th anniversary of the Union of Crowns in 1603 and the 300th anniversary of the 
Act of Union of 1707 allowed for a significant re-examination of the complex relationship 
between Scotland and England. T.C. Smout published a series of papers from leading scholars on 
the Anglo-Scot relations between 1603 and the turn of the twentieth century.52 There is fresh 
debate on the vision of James VII and II, the last Stuart monarch before the Glorious Revolution 
of 1688, for an equal representation of Scotland and England under one united government, 
                                                 
51 David Stewart, Sketches of the Character, Manners, and Present State of the Highlanders of Scotland, with 
Details of the Military Service of the Highland Regiments, 2 vols. (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable and Co., 1822). 
52 T.C. Smout, ed., Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1603-1900: Proceedings of The British Academy, vol. 127 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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English tolerance (in most cases, a lack thereof) of Scottish participation in Britain after 1707, 
and how Scotland contributed to the expanding British Empire. Paul Langford presents an 
important critique of the Union of 1707 in his essay, detailing the antagonizing efforts by the 
English to assert their dominance, and the Scots their acceptance, in the new British state.53 
Christopher Whatley and Derek Patrick made a similar contribution with The Scots and the 
Union.54 Whatley and Patrick discussed the undercurrent of mutual distrust and xenophobic 
attitudes developed by both sides prior to and after the Union of 1707. Despite a desire for 
political union by Scottish Parliamentarians that would benefit not only Scotland but England as 
well, and a display of loyalty amongst many Highlanders who had supported the Jacobite cause, 
developed through a loyal service to the British nation during the Seven Years’ War (1756-
1763), there was still a sense of misunderstanding between Scotland and England that would not 
be put to rest until after the end of the Napoleonic Wars.55 These works are vital in the 
understanding of the intricacies of the Anglo-Scottish relationship within the context of the 
eighteenth and early-nineteenth century British armed forces. 
There are two general debates within the historiography on the subject of employment of 
Scots, specifically Highlanders, in the British army. One centers on how the Scots attained a 
sense of “Britishness” after the Act of Union of 1707. The development of a British state, and the 
shared efforts of building such a state, including the expansion and consolidation of the Empire, 
                                                 
53 Paul Langford, “South Britons’ Reception of North Britons, 1707-1820,” in Anglo-Scottish Relations from 1603-
1900: Proceedings of The British Academy, vol. 127, ed. T. C. Smout (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 143-
169. For an excellent counter-argument, see Colin Kidd, “Eighteenth-Century Scotland and the Three Unions,” in 
Anglo-Scottish Relations from 1603-1900: Proceedings of The British Academy, vol. 127, ed. T. C. Smout (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 171-187. 
54 Christopher A. Whatley and Derek J. Patrick, The Scots and the Union (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2006).  
55 Ibid., 369. 
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allowed for a bond to form between Scotland and England. This bond, according to Linda Colley 
and Diana Henderson, was significantly forged on the battlefield. The “British” identity was 
formed, in large part, by fighting together for a common idea against a common enemy, France. 
The other major debate focuses on the supposed martial identity of the Highland soldier within 
the British army, which leads to the investigation of negative aspects of the employment of 
Highland soldiers. 
There are scholars who believe that the shared military experience of Scotland and 
England in wars before and after the Jacobite rebellions of 1715 and 1745 was one of, if not the 
most, important way the nation of Great Britain formed, similar to the bond that appears between 
men under the extreme stress of combat.56 The unique style of Highland dress and their 
reputation as tenacious warriors aided in bringing public praise for the Scottish soldier and 
creating a distinct nationalism amongst the Scots in the British Army. Historians’ arguments 
have developed throughout the years on how and when the British army was started, and how the 
incorporation of Scotsmen into the English army contributed to the benefit of the individual 
nations of Great Britain specifically, and to the British nation in general.  
Some historians argue that Scots became apart of an unofficially-recognized “British” 
army when serving with English and Welsh officers in foreign armies in the Wars of Religion 
raging on the European continent in the seventeenth century up until the English invitation to 
William of Orange to overthrow James II.57 In his 1971 article, “Scotland and the Glorious 
                                                 
56 See, Diana M. Henderson, Highland Soldier: A Social Study of the Highland Regiments, 1820-1920 (Edinburgh: 
John Donald Publishers, Ltd., 1989); Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1992). 
57 Robert Paul Barnes, “Scotland and the Glorious Revolution of 1688,” Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned 
with British Studies, vol. 3, no. 3 (Autumn, 1971): 116-127; John Childs, The British Army of William III, 1689-
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Revolution of 1688,” Robert Paul Barnes looks at Scottish military involvement during the 
Williamite wars of the late seventeenth century. Barnes particularly commented on the lack of 
understanding of the Scottish role in this conflict. According to Barnes, there were four key 
components in unifying Anglo-Scottish efforts to defeat James II: England’s offer to William of 
Orange, declaration of intentions, the flight of James II from Scotland, and the military defeat of 
James II in England. While the Scottish force sent to back up English troops supported the 
monarchy of James II, these four factors contributed to a severe change in loyalty. Barnes argues 
that, while fighting together against a common enemy – in this case, James VII and II – Scots 
began to feel integrated into a “British” army of English and Welsh troops.58 
In 1987 John Childs published his third and final book on the political and social  
history of the army of William III entitled The British Army of William III, 1689-1702.  
Childs asserts that English, Irish, and Scottish officers serving abroad in foreign armies  
formed a close bond with each other; without this bond, there would have been no solid officer 
corps for William to utilize. The experienced officers that served in various armies throughout 
the seventeenth century initially came back to serve James II, but could switch loyalties without 
much regard. Childs later mentions that William III only trusted those British officers who had 
served with him in the Anglo-Dutch Brigade (which was comprised of Dutch, English, and 
Scottish troops), and despised those that had served in other European armies. These British 
officers, however, gained much experience in fighting in the wars just after the Restoration in 
1660, and proved invaluable in the formation of a “British” army.59 
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Published in 2006, The Origins of the British Army, 1585-1702 perpetuates the arguments 
put forth by Robert Paul Barnes and John Childs. Roger B. Manning states that the creation of 
the modern British Army, officially in 1707, could trace its origins to wars in previous years 
which involved the English army with elements of Scots and Irish volunteers.60 Manning further 
supports his thesis with the assertion that despite the hostility between the English, Irish, and 
Scottish serving abroad in foreign armies, sharing the experience of war, in conjunction with the 
idea that they were fighting a common enemy, was crucial for the integration of the English and 
Scottish armed forces.61 Hence, the assimilation of Scottish troops happened before 1707.62  
However, others stress England and Scotland only became a united fighting force with 
the Act of Union in 1707. Diana Henderson in particular supported this idea. Henderson 
discussed the two debates on the employment of Highlanders in the British military.63 She agrees 
with the idea that military service benefited the Highlander, because it “provided a realistic outlet 
for the Highlander’s natural fighting abilities.”64 Biographies on Scottish commanders reflect 
this statement. Paul David Nelson argues that General James Grant had a penchant for fighting 
that was conditioned by the environment (Scottish Highlands) he grew up in.65 The analyses 
presented by historians here unfortunately conform to some of the same stereotypical views of 
                                                 
60 Manning, An Apprenticeship in Arms, ix. 
61 Ibid., 94, 443. 
62 Ibid, 260. 
63 Henderson, Highland Soldier, 5. Henderson stated: “…[I]t [use of Highlanders in the Army] was a deliberate 
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64 Ibid. 
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Highland soldiers as a martial race by offering explanations on individuals or groups of Scots, in 
particular Highlanders, demonstrating service in the British armed forces was beneficial not only 
for Scots but for the British nation in general. Similarly, there are historians that argue military 
service was beneficial for the formation of a “British” nation and national identity.  
Linda Colley examined the formation of Great Britain in her work, Britons: Forging the 
Nation 1707-1837. It was the shared experience of war and empire-building, Colley argued, in 
fighting a common enemy – at the time, France was the major threat – that melded the major 
bonds between Scotland and England.66 Stephen Brumwell, in his social study of the British 
army that fought in the Americas during the Seven Years’ War, added to this idea of soldiers 
forming a unified national identity that “transcended traditional national rivalries.”67 While 
Brumwell presents a fascinating look at the average British soldier with particular emphasis on 
the experiences of the Highland regiments, he weakens his statements by not fully appreciating 
the sectional differences between the respective nations of Great Britain.68 There is no doubt that 
Scotland was a key component of the British military in its wars and conquests since the Union 
of 1707. However, these general statements misrepresent the true nature of the martial attributes 
of Scotland – not to mention the similarities and differences in contribution by Highlanders and 
Lowlanders – and the trials and tribulations of Scottish soldiers and sailors in the British armed 
services. Nevertheless, these scholarly works have led to additional nuanced interpretations in 
the historiography of Scots in the British military.69 
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Scholars such as John M. MacKenzie, Andrew Mackillop, and Hew Strachan, comment 
more specifically on the identity of Scots in their military endeavors within the British army.70 
They provide valuable contributions to the debates concerning the myth of a martial heritage that 
was imposed on the Highlanders, in addition to how the Scots were able to maintain their 
national identity, whether it was traditionally militaristic or not, within the larger identity of 
“Britishness.” According to their respective works, the preservation of a national identity was 
important for the Highland soldier. Steve Murdoch and Andrew Mackillop argued that the 
“emergence of a Highland military image reveals the subtle way in which Scottish consciousness 
and popular opinion felt its way towards an extremely effective and comprehensive 
accommodation with ‘Britishness.’”71 What is even more revealing is that, contrary to the 
popular myths of the existence of a martial race, Scotland was not seen as very militaristic in 
nature. Scotland, specifically the Highlands, was not so much known for their militaristic nature 
until the Jacobite uprisings in the eighteenth century. The ’Fifteen and ’Forty-Five rebellions did 
more to promote the myth of the Highland warrior, including the famous “Highland charge.”72 
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In conjunction with these studies, recent scholarship tends to include negative aspects of 
the use of Highland soldiers and their service in the British army. Stana Nenadic argued in a case 
study on Highland gentry families and the impact of the British army that military service was 
more detrimental that beneficial for these families.73 T. M. Devine, and to an extent Stephen 
Brumwell, discussed the effects of raising so many Highland regiments after the ’Forty-Five.74 
Devine argued that the extent to which Highland soldiers were recruited during the wars of the 
mid-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries led Highland regiments “to be regarded as the 
expendable cannon-fodder of the empire.”75 Such works, published in the last ten years, are 
important for establishing how Highland soldiers reacted to service in the British military for the 
period of 1745 to 1815, and lay the foundation for a similar argument for Highlanders who 
served in militia units on the southern frontier of British-controlled territory in North America 
during the first decade of the British colonization of Georgia. 
In the case of Highlanders who fought in Georgia and Florida during the War of Jenkins’ 
Ear, later becoming King George’s War or the War of the Austrian Succession, there are two 
prominent works that stand out in the historiography. Larry Ivers in British Drums on the 
Southern Frontier: The Military Colonization of Georgia, 1733-1749 discusses the establishment 
of Georgia as a yeoman/soldier colony, where settlers would make a living for themselves 
without the aid of African slaves, and at the same time be employed as soldiers maintaining a 
constant vigilance against threats posed to British possessions.76 One of the main goals of this 
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study is to refute previous notions of General James Oglethorpe and allegations of poor 
leadership.77 Ivers approached his study with an elitist outlook, focusing more attention on the 
actions of Oglethorpe and other high-ranking military and civilian officials than incorporating 
what the common soldier or militiaman experienced. In light of the “top-down” approach Ivers 
presents, this work is essential for laying the foundation for mistreatment of Highlanders by 
primarily English officials. 
Twenty years later, Anthony Parker analyzed the town of Darien in Georgia and how the 
Highland inhabitants contributed to the early development and defense of Georgia in Scottish 
Highlanders in Colonial Georgia: The Recruitment, Emigration, and Settlement at Darien, 1735 
– 1748.78 Parker’s account takes a more sympathetic approach to understanding what the 
Highlanders experienced while colonizing Georgia. He refutes Ivers’ descriptions of the 
Highlanders as being “lazy” and ineffective in during Georgia’s trusteeship.79 Instead, Parker 
argues that the previous English settlers of Georgia failed to establish a colony, and the trustees 
for the settlement of Georgia were forced to look elsewhere, ending their search in the Scottish 
Highlands because the people there were thought to make both good farmers and soldiers.80 To 
support his argument, Parker integrated descriptions from common Highland civilians in order to 
establish the common-person perspective on life in a hostile border colony. Parker’s self-
assessment of his work is presented correctly when he asserted that the contribution of the 
Highlanders, “out of all proportion to their numbers,” was previously “neglected by most 
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Georgia histories and relegated to the shadows in others.”81 Parker is one of the first to focus 
solely on the Highlanders and their service in Georgia and Florida. This thesis will build upon 
Parker’s analysis, exploring more of the role the Highlanders played in the military campaigns 
during the colony’s early years and their response to service in the border conflict with Spanish 
Florida.  
Concerning the historiography on the Scottish Highland contribution to the establishment 
of Georgia, there must be a new military history examination of the Highland militia units that 
fought against the Spanish and their allies during the War of Jenkins’ Ear. Recent scholarly 
discourse demonstrates the Highland soldier’s maintenance of a Scottish national identity despite 
serving in a “British” army, deconstruction of the myth of the Highland soldier as an ideal 
warrior, and the significance of the Highland contribution to the British military. It is important 
to utilize this discourse when applied to the study of Highland militia in Georgia during the early 
to mid-eighteenth century. This thesis will close the gap in the historiography by creating a 
contextual analysis of how the Highland militiaman reacted to service in Georgia and Florida, 
particularly under English officers, while placing this case study within the parameters of a 
larger argument for how the British government martially employed Scottish Highlanders.  
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CHAPTER 2:  THE TRANSITION PERIOD, 1745-1815 
 
The years between the end of the ’Forty-Five and Napoleonic Wars indicates that the 
Scottish Highlands and its inhabitants went through a transition period where they became 
Anglicized as the English attempted to, in their opinion, civilize the troubled region. Part of this 
scheme necessitated the recruitment of Highland men into the British military. This chapter will 
explain how the English martially employed the Scottish Highlanders during the period of 1745 
to 1815, and will be particularly critical of the Highland experience during the French and Indian 
War. The sub-topic in British military studies presented here is important as it details the extent 
to which the British went in securing their Empire. This analysis will lay the foundation for how 
the Highlanders were deployed by the English for similar purposes during the War of Jenkins’ 




Historians agree that after the ’Forty-Five Highlanders were recruited on a large scale for 
service in the British army, and the French and Indian War was the first time a truly British army 
would be at war against a common foe.82 For Scotland, the military was a department of the 
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Highlanders within the context of “rapid socio-economic change,” where “upward pressure released by this process 
 27
Empire open to all. It was also an effective way of removing any lingering Jacobite radicalism 
from the Highlands. The pattern of military recruitment in the Highlands is an example of an 
attempt by the British government to utilize the Scots for the defense and expansion of the 
Empire. One questions why Highlanders enlisted en masse in some cases to fight for a country 
that went on a terror campaign to eradicate Jacobite sentiment in their own backyard. They did 
so for different reasons, yet in the end, the overall picture points to a cleverly crafted English 
campaign to depopulate the Highlands of manpower. 83 
Great Britain found herself in the 1750s embroiled in an inter-continental war with their 
old adversary, France. There was a great need for men to serve in the ranks of the British army, 
and one place that was looked to was Scotland. The end of the ’Forty-Five after the Battle of 
Culloden in 1746 allowed for the incorporation of thousands of potential recruits for military 
service in the British armed forces. These men were seen by the English as excellent candidates 
for military service due to their apparent natural fighting ability. Recruiting drives were 
established to engage the Highlanders in the affairs of Great Britain. There appears at this time 
(1750s) a major effort to mobilize the new pool of manpower in the Highlands for martial 
purposes. What is particularly striking was the method of recruitment exercised by the English. 
When one looks carefully at the sources from the time,  the English appear to use noble Scots as 
puppets; even Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat actively participated in recruitment despite his father’s 
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execution after the ‘Forty-Five.84 The Scottish aristocrats that participated in the rebellion would 
be able to gain back their lost titles and lands if they recruited men for the army.85 The 
Highlanders might trust the Scots (most of whom were Lowlanders) over the English recruiters. 
Apprehension of Highlanders towards English soldiers and officers after the suppression of the 
’Forty-Five was noticeable, and the English saw the opportunity to use the Scottish officers who 
wanted to prove their loyalty by having them recruit from the Highlands. 
There were many Scots, both Highland and Lowland, who were adamant about proving 
their loyalty to the Hanoverian dynasty. The English were desirous to take advantage of the new 
pool of manpower, and turned to the Scots to recruit men for the British army. Historians have 
commented on the incentives for recruiting as many men as possible, including free 
commissions, restoration of land and titles, and commuted prison terms. An example of this is 
Archibald Macdonell, who was sentenced to death after his participation in the ‘Forty-Five. 
Macdonell asked Lord George Beauclerk to release him when “informed there were new levies 
to be raised in the Highlands” because he was “willing to spend a Life in His Majesty’s service 
in any part of His British Dominions…”86 Whether Lord Beauclerk felt pity for the man or not, 
he commented on Macdonell and others who were in a similar predicament that he would like to 
see them sent off “to scalp and have their chance of being scalped…so as not to be a mere 
burden for life upon the Government.”87 It is striking how ambitious some Scots were in trying 
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to prove their loyalty. Many prominent Scots took the bait and went on large recruiting drives. 
Andrew Mackillop stated that Scots were concerned about their public image, and did their best 
to be seen as fervently patriotic to the British cause. A poem entitled, “A New Song,” was one of 
many issued in order to get the word out. The poem includes appeals to “Camel’s, Mackenzy’s 
Fraser’s and Grant’s/For they are brought up to the Sword,/Such warlike men Lord Loudoun 
wants.”88 Lord Loudoun was the first commander of British forces in North America. A noble 
Scotsman, he was particularly active in recruiting Highlanders for military service, and is an 
example of the extent to which those Scottish aristocrats that recruited for the British army went 
in proving their loyalty to the Hanoverian dynasty. 89  
Unlike the afore-mentioned “A New Song” that was meant to stir British patriotic 
sentiment, there were many other poems and tunes that lamented on the departure of Highlanders 
for service in North America. One such piece is entitled, “A Song of Departure, 1757,” and 
describes the sailing of the 78th Regiment of Foot (Fraser’s Highlanders) for duty in North 
America: “Terrible the news/As the finest men of our country/Are cheerless and 
humiliated/Surrendering their children to you...”90 This tune allows one to see the culture of the 
Highlands affected by the changes incurred from the recruitment of Scots (particularly 
Highlanders) into the British army. 
  The average Highland recruit enlisted for many reasons into an army that had previously 
hunted down some of his countrymen, yet the typical Highlander was not warlike as portrayed in 
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the past. Recent scholarship is quick to point out that the Highlands were not overflowing with 
men of distinct martial tendencies. Historians who have written on the Jacobite rebellions 
conclude that of the Highlanders that would see combat in the French and Indian War, only a few 
had ever seen combat before. However, the “notions of a Highland warrior were as real as any 
identity can be,” according to Steve Murdoch and Andrew Mackillop.91 Many Highlanders 
would enlist because of the lack of opportunities for employment in Scotland, or due to the 
devastating effects of a famine that broke out during the mid-1750s. McCulloch argued that 
recruiters from the Seventy-Seventh and Seventy-Eighth Regiments of Foot (Montgomery’s and 
Fraser’s Highlanders, respectively), were able to round up large numbers of men for service in 
the army during this time because of such hardships.92 
Perhaps one of the most alluring enticements offered to Highlanders who would serve in 
the King’s forces was the restoration of Highland traditions, particularly the wearing of the kilt. 
This is a perfect example of English attempts to draw in the Scots Gaels for their services in the 
British armed forces. The Proscription Act of 1746 restricted the everyday use of important 
Highland cultural icons (the kilt, the bagpipe), and disarmed the Highlanders, neutralizing any 
possible future threat to the security of England.93 Yet Parliament was quick to make certain 
exemptions for the Act, specifically if one served in the army, he would be able to don his 
traditional Highland garb. While the prospect of fighting did not seem so attractive to some, the 
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allure of being able to dress in their traditional clothing was enough for serving in a government 
that had stripped away many of their rights.94   
 Forced recruitment of Highlanders in the form of press gangs was a common practice 
during this period as well. Ian McCulloch described this process and the Parliamentary Act that 
allowed for magistrates to “impress all unemployed men by special degree.”95 He added a 
comment from the time by Lady Ballindalloch that “there is not many spared out of 
Inveraven.”96 Her comment shows the extent of male depopulation in the Highlands during these 
recruiting drives. Robert Kirkwood, a Lowlander serving in the 77th Regiment of Foot 
(Montgomery’s Highlanders), offered insight into this particular pattern of recruitment. 
Kirkwood enlisted in a regiment “composed of impress’d men from the Highlands.”97 Given 
these examples, some kind of effort was made by the English to drain the Highlands of 
manpower not only for anti-Jacobite reasons, but also to employ these potentially loyal soldiers 
on the frontiers of the Empire. The first such example of mass deployment of Highland infantry 
in an integrated British army was in North America against the French and their Native 
American allies. 
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The Black Watch at Fort Carillon, 1758 
 
The French and Indian War was the American theater of the Seven Years’ War, from 
1754-1763. The fighting in the Americas was particularly tough; British forces had to make 
critical adjustments in learning how to fight on the American frontier. It took them a while to 
organize a strategy that would prove effective for dealing with the French and their Native 
American allies. It was in this war that the British were able to draw on the new pool of 
manpower found in the Scottish Highlands. The Scots had played a significant role in the British 
armed forces, specifically in the Anlgo-Dutch Brigade.98 However, the French and Indian War 
saw for the first time a truly “British” army with the employment of Highlanders. The Highland 
regiments would be at the forefront of many campaigns throughout the war, none more 
significantly than at the Battle of Fort Carillon (Fort Ticonderoga) in 1758. 
 The British campaign against Fort Carillon in 1758 was one of the major engagements 
between the French and British struggling for control of North America. William R. Nester wrote 
one of the most recent accounts of the campaign. Nester analyzed in great detail the significance 
of the battle. Nester claimed that if the British took the fort when they had the chance, they 
would have captured the majority of French forces that stood between the fort and Montreal. If 
victory had been achieved, the British would have easily defeated the French in Montreal and 
Quebec, perhaps shortening the fighting by as much as two years. This was, however, not to be. 
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The British forces who assaulted Fort Carillon on July 8, 1758 saw one of the biggest and 
bloodiest defeats for British troops serving in the Americas throughout the entire war.99   
The British forces, led by Major General James Abercromby, outnumbered the French by 
as much as four to one. Under normal circumstances, this would have been enough of an 
advantage for victory. However, the French forces under the Marquis de Montcalm utilized a 
strategy of rapid fire, an assembly line system where one man fired while a small team of others 
behind the shooter would prepare the next musket. Just as the soldier at the front discharged his 
musket, another would appear soon afterwards. The French were able to loose six aimed shots 
per minute onto the advancing British in this manner. This tactic proved devastating for the 
British forces who expected the normal two to three shots per minute from the defenders of Fort 
Carillon. In tandem with the effects of the rapid fire from the French, Abercromby had his men 
attack in line-of-battle, where infantry are deployed in long, rectangular ranks so as to present a 
wall of fire when fighting an opponent. Historians, and British officers at the time, concluded 
that this was a major mistake. With hindsight on his side, Nester argued that Abercromby should 
have attacked the fort using column (maneuver) formation, rather than line-of-battle. The column 
formation would have allowed the British forces to better negotiate the many obstacles that they 
met while maneuvering through the woods and difficult terrain in front of Fort Carillon, 
including the defenses thrown up before the fort.100 
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While engaged in fighting at the fort, the 42nd Regiment of Foot (Black Watch) would 
attack time and again, battling the French for over three hours before finally heeding the call for 
retreat, which was issued around 2:30 p.m.101 Montcalm himself praised the Highlanders in their 
attacks while other British regular regiments fell back, where he commented that the “Scottish 
Highlanders returned unceasingly to the attack, without becoming discouraged or broken.”102 
The Black Watch suffered tremendously as a result of its vain efforts to dislodge the French at 
Fort Carillon. Of the 1,000 Highlanders of the Black Watch that participated in the assault, 648 
were casualties (315 killed, 333 wounded).103 The percentage of casualties suffered by the 
Highlanders, almost sixty-five per cent, is unheard of in warfare at this time. No other regiment, 
on either side, suffered such high casualties after one battle as the Black Watch did at Fort 
Carillon. In addition to the devastatingly high numbers, the disparity between dead and wounded 
is another shock. In most battles from this period in history, there is a larger gap between the 
numbers of dead and wounded suffered by a unit in battle, with the number of dead being 
relatively less that the amount of wounded. It is still not known exactly why the Black Watch 
ignored orders to fall back with the rest of the regular forces when Abercromby ordered them to. 
Regardless, the Highlanders paid a tremendous price that day for an empire that thought of them 
as expendable.  
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The Relief of Fort Pitt: The Battle of Bushy Run, 1763 
 
Many of the Highlanders served on the exposed frontier in North America, far in advance 
of the main body. James Wolfe, a prominent general in the British army, described the drudgery 
of serving on frontier duty as “the most insignificant and unpleasant branch of military 
operations,” with all who served in a “perpetual danger of assassination.”104 Shortly after the end 
of the French and Indian War, an uprising of Native Americans occurred, known as Pontiac’s 
Rebellion, which threatened the frontiers of the British-controlled colonies in North America. 
Once again, the Highlanders played a crucial role in defending the Empire. The fighting done by 
the Highlanders during this rebellion fit into the reasons why Highland regiments were deployed 
by the English in this region. Examples of the Highland charge, of Highlanders stereotypically 
seen behaving like savages – or being used because they were thought to behave like savages – 
and the belief that the Highland soldier was accustomed to fighting on difficult terrain under 
undesirable conditions, are seen in this rebellion.  
 One of, if not the major turning point of Pontiac’s Rebellion was the Battle of Bushy 
Run. David Dixon commented on the significance of this battle in Never Come to Peace Again: 
Pontiac’s Uprising and the Fate of the British Empire in North America. Dixon credited this 
battle as not completely ending the Indians’ ability to fight, yet it did put an end to the siege of 
Fort Pitt. Dixon stated that the fall of this important outpost “would have allowed [the Indians] to 
continue the war for a longer period,” with the added bonus of “an important psychological and 
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spiritual impetus.”105 The prevention of the fall of Fort Pitt allowed for the reopening of 
communication links between the frontier and Philadelphia, a vital aspect for the possibility of 
additional military campaigns or expansion of British control in the western regions of British-
controlled North America. 
 The Highlanders made up a significant portion of the column advancing to the relief of 
Fort Pitt in July and August of 1763. Of the 465 men who accompanied Colonel Henry Bouquet 
on the campaign, 390 were Highlanders, the rest being trained riflemen and wagon drivers.106 
Once again, Highlanders were being sent out on frontier duty, exposing themselves, as James 
Wolfe lamented doing years before while in service in the Highlands during the ‘Forty-Five, and 
privy to ambush and assassination. The terrain of where the battle took place was “commanded 
by high and craggy Hills,” and the path to be taken by the Highlanders was suspected by 
Bouquet to be the perfect place for an ambush to occur.107 This area, according to popular 
opinion at the time, especially that of the English, should have been perfect for the Highlander, 
who was supposed to be adept to fighting in this terrain. In addition, the apparent use of the 
Highlanders as the advance guard of the expedition should perhaps come as no surprise. Their 
deployment as the lead group in this column is evidence of their supposed capability for fighting 
in this kind of terrain, and is another example of the Highlanders manipulated by the English for 
the greater good of the British expedition.108  
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 The fighting was particularly fierce. Dixon argued that the Highlanders could only keep 
the Indian attackers at bay by making bayonet charges to force the Indians back into the woods. 
Robert Kirkwood described the trap set for the Indians: “…having made a kind of breastwork 
with the flour bags, [we] waited their approach; when they came close up, we gave them our 
whole fire, and rushed out upon them with fixt bayonets; the Indians…took to their heels, and 
left the field of battle.”109 The images of Highlanders attacking with broadsword and musket and 
laying waste to whomever was in their way as described in the primary and secondary material 
available on this battle show how this is similar to what Government forces encountered during 
the ’Fifteen and ’Forty-Five uprisings.110 Colonel Bouquet commented on the severity of the 
fighting, where the Indians “resolutely returned Fire, but could not Stand the irresistible Shock of 
our Men, who rushing in among them, killed many of them.”111 This and the other charges made 
by the Highlanders confirm the afore-mentioned tactics the Jacobites used during the ‘Fifteen 
and ’Forty-Five rebellions, particularly the devastating charge during the Battle of Culloden.  
The Battle of Bushy Run, while not a particularly bloody engagement as compared to the 
slaughter pen of Ticonderoga five years before, was still an important engagement in the history 
of the British military, and more specifically the history of Scottish influence in the British 
armed forces. Dixon credited this victory as perhaps the “most complete victory” of British 
forces over Native Americans.112 It should not be lost on the minds of historians the significance 
of the stereotypical Highland warrior images that come out of this battle. The Highlanders that 
participated in Bushy Run are depicted as charging multiple times at the enemy, each time with 
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bayonets and broadswords at the ready. All these characteristics are similar to reasons why, at 
least in the opinions of the English, the Highlanders would be perfect candidates for defending 
the Empire against her enemies. 
 
The Peninsular Campaign 
 
Instances of martial misappropriation are not confined to the eighteenth century. The 
threat of radical revolutionary ideas from France and the conquests of Napoleon on the European 
continent caused patriotic fervor to reach a high in the early years of the nineteenth century in 
Britain.113 As a result, the British armed forces expanded exponentially, and one of the areas 
most affected was Scotland, specifically the Highlands.114 During this time, more Highland 
regiments were raised than at any point previous in British military history. An anonymous 
memoir of a soldier in the 71st Highland Light Infantry details the story of this regiment and their 
involvement in campaigns during the Napoleonic Wars.115 This text serves as an example of the 
involvement of Highlanders in the British armed services during the disastrous British operation 
in Argentina in 1806 to 1807 and the vicious fighting on the Iberian Peninsula between 1808 and 
1814.  
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While on campaign in South America, the Seventy-First encountered extreme weather 
conditions, excessive fatigue while marching long distances, and abnormal battle orders. The 
anonymous soldier described how he and his regiment were forced to work around the clock 
constructing fortifications while laboring in oppressive heat.116 The author detailed one particular 
battle in July 1807, when his regiment was ordered to attack a town at bayonet point with empty 
muskets. The enlisted men were taken aback by this order, commenting to one another, “We are 
betrayed.”117 From this assessment, the Highlanders were deployed as they would be in the 
stereotypical “Highland charge” manner, with muskets replacing broadswords and targets.118 
Overall, the campaign in South America saw few British victories and many set-backs, such as 
the ill-fated assault by General John Whitelocke on Buenos Aires in July 1807.119 
The British faced a formidable enemy once they joined the Portuguese on the Iberian 
Peninsula. However, the campaign season of 1808 proved better for the British and allied forces 
than what was originally expected. In August the French were turned back at the Battle of 
Vimeiro. It was here that the Seventy-First, while protecting a few artillery pieces captured 
during the battle, came under attack by French cavalry.120 The winter of 1808-1809 was 
particularly harsh for the soldiers in the Seventy-First. The Highlander experienced heavy 
downpours of rain, bitter cold, and gnawing hunger. Many shared the author’s sentiment when 
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he stated that “this was the most dreadful period of my life.”121 Donald McDonald, the author’s 
friend in the regiment, sobbed at the idea that he would never again see Scotland.122 Images such 
as these are problematic for scholars who believe that war was a unifying experience for the 
nations of Great Britain.  
Between the campaigns for Lisbon and Fuentes de Oñoro in 1810-1811, the Seventy-First 
yet again met with demanding conditions on the battlefield while facing adverse weather and 
terrain. In October 1810, the regiment, deployed as skirmishers, fought French elements in and 
around the village of Sobral while the rest of the advance guard fell back.123 The Highlanders, at 
first driven out of the barricades they erected, re-formed and pursued the French through the 
village and beyond, skirmishing with French elements for several days.124 The Seventy-First was 
so far in advance they had trouble receiving supplies, going without even basic food such as 
bread.125 The men of the Seventy-First were, according to the author, forced to forage or face 
starvation. The regiment finally halted their pursuit until supply wagons reached them. During 
the three-day battle of Fuentes de Oñoro in 1811, a battalion of the 71st, along with a battalion of 
the 24th Regiment of Foot and 79th Regiment of Foot (Cameron Highlanders) were thrown into 
one of the most important spots on the battlefield, a village near Fuentes de Oñoro, suffering 
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over four hundred casualties; the regiment was reduced to an effective fighting strength of less 
than two hundred officers and enlisted men.126 
The fighting continued to rage in Spain between the latter months of 1811 through 1813, 
the British and Spanish forces slowly forcing the French out of the Iberian peninsula. During the 
battle of Almaraz in May 1812, the Seventy-First, along with elements of the 50th Regiment of 
Foot, were ordered to take a heavily-defended fort on the opposite bank of the Tagus River. The 
taking of the fort, and the subsequent retreat of the French and destruction of their bridge by the 
British, cut the main line of communications between the French commanders in the region, 
Marshals Nicolas Soult and Auguste Marmont.127 An anonymous soldier of the Seventy-First, 
while on duty one evening, discovered some Highlanders singing: “Why did I leave my Jeanie, 
my daddy’s cot, an’ a’,/To wander from my country, sweet Caledonia.”128 The song, according 
to the author, is one of “Scotland’s sweetest songs of remembrance.”129 The Highlanders appear 
to lament their current state by singing nationalistic songs of Scotland, not of Great Britain. The 
singing of this counters the arguments made by historians who believe the sense of “Britishness” 
was forged on the battlefield. 
While pursuing the French across the Pyrenees during the campaigns of 1813 to 1814, the 
Seventy-First saw some of the worst fighting, including the action at Vittoria on June 21, 1813. 
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Heading the initial advance were battalions of the Seventy-First, 50th Regiment of Foot, and 92nd 
Regiment of Foot (Gordon Highlanders) under command of Colonel Henry Cadogan.130 The 
Seventy-First bore the brunt of withering French fire as they tried to negotiate a ravine near 
Zumelzu.131 It was at this battle that the regiment suffered the most out of the entire Allied force 
engaged, where they incurred over three hundred casualties, including their commanding 
officer.132  
The plight of the 71st Highland Light Infantry is indicative of the way other Highland 
regiments in the British army were used in previous conflicts. In battle after battle, the 71st was 
thrust into the most savage of fighting, as seen in major engagements at Vimeiro, Fuentes de 
Oñoro, and Vittoria, and at comparatively minor battles at Sobral and Almaraz. Despite the fact 
that the Seventy-First was a light company, and would have been placed in front during opening 
movements on the battlefield, the extreme situations these Highlanders were under, whether 
battling the elements or fighting in seemingly impossible situations, suggests that the English, 
seeing the Highlanders through the English-constructed stereotypical lens of the Highlander’s 
natural martial capabilities, deployed the Seventy-First in a manner conducive to what was 
expected of the Highlanders at this time.133 The American defeat of British forces at the Battle of 
New Orleans at the close of the War of 1812 confirms this notion upon examination of how the 
93rd Regiment of Foot (Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders) was employed in this engagement. 
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The Battle of New Orleans 
 
 The War of 1812 (1812-1814) provides another setting to examine the strains Highland 
forces were under when fighting for the British nation. This section will focus on the attack by 
the 93rd Regiment of Foot (Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders) on American forces outside New 
Orleans. The battle, and the role the Ninety-Third played, demonstrates the martial 
misappropriation of Scottish Highlanders by English officers in battle. The 93rd Highland 
Regiment became one of the last British regiments to suffer, perhaps needlessly, at the Battle of 
New Orleans, the last major engagement of the war.  
 In preparation for the attack on the southern United States, the British built up a strong 
force of nearly 10,000 men, including the Ninety-Third which sailed from Plymouth to the West 
Indies in September 1814.134 By late November 1814, an invasion force of fifty ships set sail for 
United States territory; by now the American forces were well-aware of British intentions, and 
began assembling their forces near the anticipated British landing site.135 Once the British 
landed, the race was on to New Orleans. Several days of skirmishing between American and 
British forces in late December precipitated the major engagement, allowing the Americans to 
improve their defenses outside the city. In almost every engagement, the British failed to assess 
their dominant position over the Americans, and the numerically-inferior American forces fell 
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back and re-organized.136 By January 1, 1815 the British artillery was in position to commence 
the bombardment of the main American positions. 
 The British plan was to feign an assault on the American right flank while the main attack 
would come at the other end of the line, the British moving through swamps to surprise the 
American defenders. Colonel William Thornton was to lead several companies of infantry in the 
main assault during the night of January 7-8, but he did not begin moving troops until well after 
the designated start time; the element of surprise was lost.137 The movement of Thornton’s men 
dictated how General John Keane’s brigade, consisting of the 93rd and 95th Regiments, would be 
used in the engagement.138 If Thornton achieved success against the Americans, Keane would 
assist in drawing American attention away from Thornton so the breach could be further 
exploited. Despite a late start in his assault, Thornton was able to drive back the defenders and 
create a significant threat to the American position.139 However, the attack on the American right 
flank began to falter, posing a risk to the opposite flank, and Thornton began a retreat back to the 
British lines.140  
 The attack by the British left flank now became the focal point with the failure of 
Thornton. British skirmishers, made up of light companies of Keane’s and Colonel Robert 
Rennie’s columns, reached the American lines first with ladders.141 After a fierce fight, the 
British light companies were driven back. The main British thrust now commenced on the 
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American lines. The 93rd Regiment moved obliquely across the battlefield, supporting General 
Samuel Gibbs, drawing heavy fire from the Americans who used five rotating ranks of musket 
fire provided by the infantry and devastating grape shot by the artillery to obliterate the 
Highlanders as they moved across the battlefield.142 Despite the loss of over half of the men in 
the Ninety-Third, Keane decided to press on with the attack. Those that did approach near the 
American lines became bogged down in a canal, where a steady fire ended any hope of British 
success.143 To the horror of the officers and men in the Ninety-Third, Keane ordered the 
regiment to halt and take what cover they could find while the British attempted to regroup and 
attempt another push towards the American defenses.144 Realizing the American position was 
impregnable, General Sir John Lambert, acting commander of the British force for the mortally-
wounded Packenham, ordered a retreat.145  
According to Donald R. Hickey, the Battle of New Orleans on January 8 was “the most 
lopsided engagement of the war.”146 The battle was particularly harsh for the 93rd Highlanders, 
who suffered 545 casualties; this equates to just over one quarter of the entire casualty figures for 
the British.147 The Highlanders appeared to be confused during the latter stages of the battle, and 
with the loss of so many officers, fifteen commissioned and over twenty non-commissioned, the 
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regiment lost cohesion and began to falter.148One wonders why Keane ordered the Highlanders 
to continue their attack when so many officers were down.     
 The Ninety-Third already made an impression on its brigade commander, Keane, despite 
being formed a just over a decade before and not seeing much combat. According to Charles 
Brooks, the regiment, formed in response to the threat France posed to Europe in 1803, 
pleasantly surprised the English officers in the field and in Britain, as well as politicians in 
Parliament.149 If the 93rd Regiment lacked experience on the battlefield, why was the regiment 
praised at this stage in their development? According to John MacKenzie, Highland clothing, 
notably the kilt, became the standard dress for nearly all Scottish regiments serving the British 
army.150 The Highland regiments raised after the ’Forty-Five were a construct of the English 
who wanted the men in these regiments to wear the typical iconic clothing associated with the 
Highlands, its inhabitants thought of as militaristic by birth.151 The English wanted the Scottish 
soldier to appear strong and tenacious in battle; to achieve this they fashioned the new regiments 
in the manner of the stereotypical Highland warrior. In the case of the attack on American 
positions at New Orleans, the Highlanders of the Ninety-Third were perhaps thought of by their 
English officers as capable of completing the task at hand, regardless of the lack of officers to 
maintain stability within the faltering ranks.  
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Opinion of Highlanders: Perspectives from English Generals and Politicians 
 
After the end of the last Jacobite rising in 1746 and the extinguishing of virtually  
any Jacobite sentiment in the Scottish Highlands, Scots began to play a more important  
role in the British army. Studies on the impact of Scots in the British army prior to 1746  
have analyzed how Scottish officers gained experience by serving in foreign armies  
in Europe. However, most of these officers were Lowlanders. The inclusion of the Highlands 
after the ’Forty-Five allowed for a fully integrated Scottish officer corps in the British army. The 
Lowlander officer was highly sought after due to his sophisticated martial education abroad; the 
Highlander was sought after for several reasons, including his own military experience and the 
added benefit (for the English) of the removal of possible Jacobite leadership. In the years after 
the ’Forty-Five more and more Scottish regiments, particularly Highland ones, began to appear 
in the British army. The total incorporation of the Highlands into Great Britain offered the 
British army a new pool of manpower from which to draw on. This was also one of the most 
important times for post-Jacobite Scotland and her relations with England.  
James Wolfe, future commander of the British expedition against the French at Quebec 
during the French and Indian War, stated very strongly his feelings on Highlanders, and did so 
on more than one occasion. In one piece of correspondence, he lectured a friend on the qualities 
of the Highlander: “[The Highlanders] are hardy, intrepid, accustomed to a rough country, and 
no great mischief if they fall.”152 Wolfe’s opinion here, a few years after his service during the 
‘Forty-Five, is an example not only of the Scotophobia that appeared during the eighteenth 
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century in England, but also the opinion of some who thought that the Highlanders inherently 
suitable for combat.153 Historian Hew Strachan examined a similar statement in regards to 
Wolfe’s thoughts on the Highlanders. He quotes James Wolfe asking in 1751: “‘How can you 
better employ a secret enemy than by making his end conducive to the common good?’”154 The 
quote from Wolfe and Strachan’s subsequent comments indicate that Wolfe was also of the 
opinion that by draining the Highlands of its male population and putting them into the British 
armed forces, the opportunity for any further Jacobite insurgency would diminish. These 
comments by Wolfe are excellent examples of the desire to take advantage of the Highlanders, 
not to mention common stereotypical English views of the Highlanders.  
British politicians, while sometimes using somewhat softer language, still conveyed a 
sense of necessity for the use of Highlanders in military service in their speeches in and out of 
Parliament. William Pitt desired to get his thoughts out for posterity, perhaps in order to preserve 
his place in history as, according to him, one of the few Englishmen at the time to comment 
positively on the employment of Highlanders in the British army. Pitt commented in 1766 on the 
decision to use Highlanders: “I sought merit wherever it could be found; it is my boast that I was 
the first minister who looked for it and found it in the mountains of the north. I called it forth and 
drew into your service a hardy and intrepid race of young men…[who] fought with valour and 
conquered for you in every part of the world.”155 Pitt praised the Highlanders on their service 
during the French and Indian War in his address, citing their defense of British territories abroad. 
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However, his speech could be construed as justifying the propaganda used to recruit the 
Highlanders. 
In 1750 the Secretary of War, Lord Barrington, announced to Parliament his desire to 
incorporate “as many Scottish soldiers in the army as possible” but made note of his preference 
for “as many Highlanders as possible.”156 Lord Barrington’s statement came at a time when the 
English were realizing the potential “benefits” of employing the Highlanders in the British army. 
These included, as James Wolfe stated a year earlier, the elimination of any possible Jacobite 
threats, while utilizing a new source of manpower for defending the Empire at home and 
abroad.157 Lord Barrington concurred with the idea that Highlanders were perfect for service 
abroad, as, in his opinion, they were accustomed to living tough lives. 
Charles, 3rd Duke of Richmond, expressed his feelings on the intermingling of Scots and 
English officers in the British army in a letter to his brother in 1757. The Duke expressed his 
sorrow at his brother’s wish to join an all-Highland regiment when he asked why he would want 
to serve in a regiment that is “commanded and composed of rebels?” The Duke continued his 
tirade by ordering his brother to “drop…[his] fondness for the Scotch in general….[and] do not 
choose among them your friends. It can never do you any honour and may be of disservice to 
you.”158 The Duke of Richmond’s comments demonstrate the severe disdain some English 
politicians had of the Scots, especially after the ‘Forty-Five.  
Louis Antoine de Bougainville, who was standing near Montcalm where the Highlanders 
assaulted Fort Carillon (Fort Ticonderoga) in July 1758, revealed later his thoughts on the 
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service of Highlanders in the British army. Bougainville claimed after the battle that the 
Highlanders who were deployed against the French “understand very well they are sent to 
America in great numbers by the British in order to depopulate their lands and even hopes of 
seeing some of them killed.”159 It seems as though Bougainville may have been correct in his 
observations. The Highlanders suffered more casualties than any other British unit there, and 
Bougainville’s commentary highlights some of the sentiment of English politicians and officers 




 In the wake of the last Jacobite rebellion, the Scots, particularly the Highlanders, played a 
significant role in the British army. Before the ’Forty-Five some Scottish officers joined other 
officers from Great Britain in serving abroad in foreign armies to gain experience. These officers 
were sought after for the training they received. However, the antipathy for which the English 
held the Scots after the ’Forty-Five is reflected in the manner in which the Highlanders were 
recruited, where they fought, and the general opinions of influential English officers and 
politicians.  
 Highlanders did enlist on their own accord in some cases, yet many were also pressed 
into service, as is seen in the 77th Regiment of Foot (Montgomery’s Highlanders). The English 
took advantage of those Highlanders who wanted their lands and titles restored after the ’Forty-
Five, or those not involved with the Jacobites but seeking to prove their loyalty to the 
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Hanoverian dynasty, to recruit men for military service. The English took advantage of the 
Highlanders who wished to have returned to them cultural aspects, such as the kilt and bagpipe, 
which Parliament took away with the Proscription Act of 1746. The only place where 
Highlanders could use these and other treasured items was in the army. For the English, draining 
the Highlands of any lingering Jacobite threat was an important factor in deciding to employ 
large numbers of Highlanders into the British armed services.  
 The French and Indian War was the first conflict where a truly “British” army fought 
together, one that included Scottish Highland regiments. These regiments, some composed of 
men who were pressed into service or lured by the promise of the ability to wear their tartans, 
saw some of the fiercest fighting in the American theater. The Black Watch suffered nearly 
sixty-five per cent casualties during the attack on Fort Carillon, a casualty rate unheard of at the 
time. The Highlanders who accompanied Colonel Henry Bouquet to relieve Fort Pitt in 1763 
experienced the type of warfare the English thought the Highlanders were accustomed to. These 
Highlanders fought on the frontier, exposed to all its dangers, a duty lamented by General James 
Wolfe. Fort Carillon and Bushy Run are only two battles from this conflict that exemplify the 
extent of the misunderstanding of Scots Gaels as natural warriors as a result of English demands 
for more men for the British army. 
 The beginning of the nineteenth century saw Highland regiments raised on an 
unprecedented scale. Yet, the manner in which these regiments were deployed did not change. 
As demonstrated by the experiences of the 71st Highland Light Infantry during the Peninsular 
campaign and the 93rd Regiment of Foot (Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders) at New Orleans, 
the English commanders on the battlefield continued to use the Highlanders as the English 
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thought they should be used. This included mass charges with empty muskets (a symbol of the 
“Highland charge,” where muskets substituted broadswords and targets), based on the notion that 
Highlanders were suited for combat on difficult terrain, and the disposition of Highland 
regiments during battle concurs with this theory.160 
 The opinion of English officers and politicians on Highlanders and their incorporation in 
the British army was critical for this period in the wake of the last Jacobite uprising in 1745. The 
passing of the Proscription Act of 1746 allowed for influential English politicians to tempt the 
Highlanders who wanted to retain important cultural symbols to join the armed services. This 
relieved the English who feared another Jacobite rebellion. Some high-ranking English officers 
and politicians, however, held the Highlanders in contempt. Officers such as James Wolfe had 
such disdain for Highlanders that he went so far as to call for their use as cannon fodder. The 
Duke of Richmond advised his brother, an officer in the British army, to avoid socializing with 
any Scots he might encounter.  
 Scholars who study this topic have done tremendous work in re-interpreting the role and 
impact of Scots in the British army in the wake of the ’Forty-Five. Their works, aided by the 
utilization of new sources as a result of extensive archival research, significantly enhanced what 
is known of the Scots, particularly Highlanders, during this time. The Highlanders encountered 
more trials and tribulations than what is represented above, especially fighting the French on 
Guadeloupe. The analytical framework outlined above will offer scholars a more useful 
framework to see how Highland and Lowland Scots participated in the expansion and 
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consolidation of the British Empire. Recent scholarship discusses only a small part of this, and 
there is ample room for further research. This framework will now be used to explain in the next 
chapter how English army officers and government officials employed Scottish Highlanders in 
the colony of Georgia allies during the War of Jenkins’ Ear (1739-1748).  
 54
 
CHAPTER 3:  SCOTTISH HIGHLANDERS DURING  
THE WAR OF JENKINS’ EAR 
 
 The security of the southern frontier of British-occupied territory in North America was a 
key component of stability for the British in the region. South Carolina militia and regular British 
military units bore the brunt of this initiative in the first two decades of the eighteenth century, 
completing a vicious three-year war with the Yemassee in 1728.161 Skirmishes with the 
Yemassee and other Native American communities, as well as the Spanish, cost the South 
Carolinians financially and in manpower. According to Larry Ivers, the establishment of the 
colony of Georgia allayed the fears of South Carolinians on the possible destruction of their 
colony; it would “absorb the bloody raids” of the Spanish and their allies.162  Within a decade of 
its establishment as a chartered colony in 1733, Georgia and its inhabitants found themselves at 
war with a potentially destructive enemy just beyond its southern border. It was now up to the 
colonists of Georgia, a large part of them recruited from the Scottish Highlands, to patrol and 
defend the southern extent of British-controlled land in North America.163 
There was an intense rivalry between Great Britain and Spain during the early eighteenth 
century. Each side had grievances against the other, including British dominance over formers 
Spanish possessions such as Gibraltar and Minorca, British and Spanish privateers hampering the 
other country’s imperial trade, and, more recently, the border between British Georgia and 
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Spanish Florida.164 Throughout the later-1720s and 1730s, Britain and Spain were locked in 
fierce negotiations over commercial trade and land rights in the Americas, aspects that, as 
H.W.V. Temperley argued, could threaten war.165 What finally drove the two countries to 
declare war in 1739 not only included the failure of the British and Spanish diplomats to fully 
comply with the demands of the other country, but the threat of foreign intervention by France 
resulting in a grand Bourbon alliance between Spain and France, a partnership that drove even 
the most anti-war British politicians to change their mind. 
Early in the 1730s, British diplomats met with their Spanish counterparts to negotiate a 
settlement in the numerous disputes each country had against the other. One of the main qualms 
between the two countries concerned trade, which was being hampered by Spanish and British 
privateers, in addition to the extra-legal trade involving British merchants in Spanish colonies.166 
With the British colonization of Georgia, there was a growing concern amongst the Spanish 
about the security of her possessions in southern North America and the Caribbean. Even the 
Duke of Newcastle, an agitator throughout the process of negotiations, had doubts about the 
legitimacy of British claims to Georgia.167 Neither side wanted to go to war, and yet diplomats 
and politicians in Great Britain and Spain were not willing to back down from their demands of 
the other country.168 
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Amongst the British who desired peace, none was more vocal than Sir Robert Walpole, 
then First Lord of the Treasury. Walpole equated peace with better trade and a booming 
economy, arguing these points even when war with Spain seemed inevitable.169 Throughout the 
1720s and 1730s Britain, and particularly Spain, desired to increase the amount of trade flowing 
between the metropole and the colonies.170 There were pressing arguments for a war where 
British victory meant a more liberal sea passage for British ships and increased access to raw 
materials in the Americas and Caribbean.171 Despite the growing clamor for war, both sides 
began to back down from their bellicose statements, and between January and early March 1739, 
preparations for war came to a halt.172 
Negotiations broke down again for the last time in May 1739 when Spain refused to 
repay reparations to the British merchant group South Sea Company, not to mention a British 
fleet, recalled when relations were favorable between Spain and Britain in January, put to sea 
again on March 10.173 In addition to payment and land grievances, the threat of a pacte de 
famille of the French and Spanish Bourbon monarchies led even those staunchly opposed to war 
like Walpole to consider action before this threat could materialize.174 Hostilities began in June 
and July, with war formally declared on October 23, 1739.175 One of the first theaters of the war 
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developed over the boundary dispute on what constituted British and Spanish territory along the 
southeastern coast of North America. 
  The formation of Georgia may be looked at within the context of the framework 
established in the previous chapter, where the Highlanders who participated in security 
operations and outright warfare on the Georgia-Florida border in the decades before receiving 
the status of a royal colony did so according to how the English perceived the Highlanders 
should be used in combat. A key purpose in the establishment of Georgia was that it would be a 
militarized colony; the colonists, males in this case, would serve as yeomen farmers (slavery was 
forbidden at this time), and maintain patrols against incursions from beyond the western and 
southern borders of Georgia.176 In the first two years of Georgia’s existence, the trustees of the 
colony, almost all of them English, developed a system of defense that incorporated Yamacraw 
allies, rangers and boatmen from South Carolina, and Highland rangers and militia from Georgia, 
the latter two units led by Captain John Mackintosh.177 The original defense system developed 
by South Carolina was manned by no more than one hundred men, and served as a reference for 
how the trustees would set up the defensive system for Georgia in the 1730s.178 
 Another component of the militarization of Georgia was building militarized positions 
along the Altamaha River. James Oglethorpe, a member of the Board of Trustees for the 
establishment of Georgia, was able to raise ₤26,000 from Parliament for his scheme, approved 
by the trustees, of constructing two fortified towns along the Altamaha River, one occupied by 
Scottish Highlanders and the other by a mix of English and Salzburger colonists.179 The 138 
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Highlanders recruited by Georgia trustees embarked from Scotland in October 1735 and arrived 
in Georgia in January 1736 to settle the garrison of New Inverness, later renamed Darien.180 
Once in Georgia, the Highlanders received a broadsword, target, and, perhaps as a sign of 
decreasing government expenditures, a “poorly-manufactured musket.”181 According to the 
South Carolinians, Georgia and its inhabitants were to relieve the South Carolinians from the 
burdens of frontier guerilla-style warfare that had plagued the colony since the first decade of the 
eighteenth century. If the Georgians were to achieve any success against Britain’s enemies in 
North America, they should have been supplied with proper equipment. Instead, it appears the 
Highlanders were to rely more on their broadswords and targets, which complied with the 
English stereotypical view at the time of the Highland warrior brandishing his broadsword and 
conducting unconventional warfare against conventional foes. 
 During the first three years after the founding of Highland settlements along the 
Altamaha River, the inhabitants were under a near constant state of military preparedness. In his 
first visit to Darien in February 1736, James Oglethorpe inspected the town where the 
Highlanders turned out in their plaid uniforms with complete military kit.182 The display, of 
which Oglethorpe commented the Highlanders made a “manly appearance,” only reinforced his 
and the Trustees’ views on the use of Highlanders as perhaps the only reliable defense on the 
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border with Spanish Florida.183 The Trustees themselves placed the Highlanders under strict 
living conditions which interfered with how the Highlanders desired to run their settlements, 
which included the restriction of slave labor.184 By April 1736 two forts had been built under 
Oglethorpe’s direction, one on Saint Simon’s Island with an English garrison, the other on 
Cumberland Island with a Highland garrison.185 It is interesting to note the Highland fort on 
Cumberland Island was situated far closer to the border with Spanish Florida than the fort on 
Saint Simon’s Island, a linear distance of about twenty miles between the two fortifications. 
Whether this was intentional or not, the fact that the Highlanders built and manned the southern-
most fort clearly demonstrates the intentions of the Trustees, specifically Oglethorpe. The 
Highlanders were to position themselves at a point where their supposed inherited natural 
fighting capabilities were to be used in conducting guerilla operations as well as manning 
troublesome frontier defensive positions.186  
 Another fort, Fort Saint George, was rebuilt in September 1736 in northeastern Spanish 
Florida, near modern Mount Cornelia.187 Fort Saint George was manned by Ensign Hugh 
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Mackay, Jr. and Highland militia to alleviate the burden of constant vigilance on the frontier by 
other troops.188 The following year, Highland militia from Darien under the command of 
Lieutenant John Mackintosh finished the project and began the detested process of patrolling the 
frontier for signs of the enemy. After weeks spent in a constant state of alert for Spanish raiding 
parties, the Highlanders were contemptuous of life on the frontier.189 The families of the 
militiamen sent to the forts in southeast Georgia and Spanish Florida also suffered as a result of 
the prolonged absence of a majority of the labor force. The supplies given to Darien by the 
Trustees, meant only to last a year until the settlement became self-sufficient, were supplemented 
for an additional three years due to the lack of manpower in the town.190 By the end of 1737 the 
only rangers that maintained patrols on the border were the Highland Rangers led by Ensign 
Hugh Mackay, Jr., as the others had been recalled for various duties in South Carolina.191 
 Throughout 1737 the fledgling colony of Georgia braced for an invasion from the 
Spanish and her allies in Florida.192 The Spanish never launched a full scale invasion, but sent 
raiding parties in the spring and summer of that year which alarmed the local populace as well as 
the Trustees.193 Highlanders stationed on Amelia Island fought off one such incursion of thirty 
Spaniards; the garrison remained “in a constant state of alarm” until the threat ended later that 
year.194 Oglethorpe sought immediate assistance from Parliament, and consulted with First Lord 
of the Treasury Sir Robert Walpole on procuring British regular units for the defense of 
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Georgia.195 Walpole remained cautious on sending regular troops to defend the frontier in 
Georgia, but finally consented to Oglethorpe’s request.196 He agreed to the dispatch of a 
regiment, the Forty-Second Regiment of Foot, to Georgia. Walpole’s hesitation on whether any 
British military personnel should be stationed on the southern frontier conformed with his 
peaceful endeavors throughout much of the 1730s to avoid a major war with Spain. However, as 
colonist Hugh Anderson made clear to James Oglethorpe, the deployment of only the Forty-
Second Regiment of Foot “would little suffice to withstand the enemy,” and that in the near 
future posed a danger to the Trustees as the regulars might mutiny against the conditions 
imposed upon them.197 
In November 1737, the governor of Spanish Florida, Manuel de Montaino informed the 
governor of Cuba about the intentions of the British in regards to a possible invasion of Florida 
that were presented to the British Parliament by Governor Oglethorpe.198 He was certain that 
Spanish Florida was susceptible to invasion, and that the British would do so before the decade 
was out. Montaino commented that the British, in his opinion, would attempt to conquer Spanish 
Florida because the area was “more useful to Great Britain than all its remaining Colonies and 
Islands in America.”199 Thus, the Highlanders stationed at the extremities of British territory in 
North America were to provide a strong, militarized colony as a base of operations against the 
Spanish and her allies in Florida. As will be demonstrated, the Highlanders, in part due to the 
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preference of the British government to rely on provincial troops to secure colonial investments, 
were used specifically for raid and counter-raid actions in Florida, a duty the Highlanders were 
thought particularly capable of handling given the apparent extensive training in guerilla warfare 
tactics in the Highlands demonstrated during the ’Fifteen Rebellion. 
Conditions continued to deteriorate in Georgia as the year 1738 brought more hardships 
to the Highland colonists. A poor harvest the previous year led the Highlanders to discuss open 
revolt against the Trustees if the Highlanders did not have their demands met.200 The elite 
amongst the Highlanders, particularly those with better education, provided the voice for all 
Highland colonists in setting before the Trustees their concerns over the present disposition of 
the colony.201 Oglethorpe, now the commander of all forces in defense of the southern frontier of 
British-occupied territory in North America, demonstrated his power over the colonists when he 
exercised his authority, backed by the other Trustees, in quelling the rebellious Highlanders.202 
Discontent amongst colonists reached a climax in November when forces stationed at Fort Saint 
Andrews mutinied over the extreme situations they faced on a daily basis; Highland militia units 
were sent to quell the uprising and restore order to the area.203 
  The first half of 1739 saw a flurry of diplomatic activity between the Spanish and British 
over the possibility of war between the two countries. One of the main factors in the cries for war 
on both sides was the establishment of Georgia and its purpose as a military buffer against the 
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Spanish in Florida.204 In June, Great Britain and Spain agreed to halt all efforts in their respective 
military build-up operations; Oglethorpe had other intentions.205 In early July, Oglethorpe 
gathered a force of nearly thirty men, composed almost entirely of Highlanders, and led a 
reconnaissance expedition into the activity of Spanish forces in Florida.206 This endeavor was 
successful in proving the Spanish continued to gather men and matériel after the agreement 
between Spain and Great Britain was signed and in securing alliances between Native American 
communities and the British. In late September a message from King George II reached 
Oglethorpe in Georgia that the uneasy peace with Spain had deteriorated, and that Oglethorpe 
was to “annoy the Subjects of Spain” in any manner he sought fit.207 This order, coupled with 
Oglethorpe’s choice of Highlanders to accompany him in his expedition into Florida in early 
1740, demonstrates the mindset of the English on how the Highlanders should be best used to 
fully utilize them for their martial capabilities. The Highlanders, apparent experts on hit-and-run 
tactics necessary for movement through enemy territory in Spanish Florida and for the manner in 
which King George II desired to harass the Spanish in the two months before war broke out in 
October, were to be a significant feature throughout the war between Spain and Britain.208 
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Outbreak of War 
 
The necessity of having a force to use in patrolling and security operations along the 
southern frontier became even greater after October 1739. On the twenty-third of that month, war 
was officially declared between Spain and Great Britain; preparations began almost immediately 
when word of this reached Georgia.209 Oglethorpe appeared to have become tremendously 
excited over the declaration of hostilities between the British and Spanish, a fact not entirely 
unexpected given his past with the militarization of Georgia.210 One of the first major actions 
occurred in mid-November 1739 and involved, not surprisingly, Highland militia units. In the 
early hours of November 13, the garrison on Amelia Island, consisting of sixteen Highlanders, 
twelve regulars from the Forty-Second Regiment, and a handful of women and children were 
startled by an ambush of a dozen Yemassee warriors allied with the Spanish.211 Two unarmed 
Highland guards were killed, the sole casualties in the attack.212 Their deaths were the result of 
the defensive measures enacted by Oglethorpe and the Trustees to use the supposed inherent 
martial capabilities of the Highlanders on the southern frontier of British-occupied North 
America.  
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Shortly after the raid on Amelia Island, Oglethorpe collected a force consisting of nearly 
two hundred militia, regular troops, mounted rangers (including the newly-formed Troop of 
Highland Rangers raised from the Highland garrison at Amelia Island less than a week after the 
ambush there), and allied Native Americans for an excursion into Spanish Florida.213 These 
soldiers were to conduct unconventional warfare against the Spanish and her allies, and gather 
intelligence on the strength and size of the enemy in Florida.214 The British, under General James 
Oglethorpe, operated under the orders presented to them by King George II: to harass the enemy 
wherever found. This allowed Oglethorpe to deploy his men, specifically the Highland infantry 
and mounted rangers, into extreme combat situations where they were constantly thrust onto the 
front line of most engagements in order to please the English military and political leaders who 
misappropriated them for their supposed natural fighting prowess. 
Darien was drained of manpower for the British invasion of Spanish Florida in 1740. The 
removal of the men from the Highland communities, particularly at Darien, put a tremendous 
strain on the families they left behind, and threatened their existence in Georgia.215 Highlanders 
not already under arms in a ranger detachment or militia companies were hastily assigned to 
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units created especially for the expedition.216 Those that did serve wore the traditional uniforms 
and equipage of the average Highland soldier: tartans, muskets, broadswords and target.217 The 
mounted rangers employed similar items, but made more use of dirks and claymores; they 
transitioned to English-style clothing later in the campaign.218 Whether by choice or not, the 
Highlanders initially went into battle armed and clothed in the fashion known to the English to 
be the standard look of the Highland soldier, but ill-suited for the inhospitable conditions in 
southern Georgia and northern Florida.  
The first major encounters of the war occurred in January 1740, when elements of the 
British and Spanish forces clashed at Fort Picolata and Fort Pupo.219 At both locations, the 
Highland Rangers and Chickasaw, Uchee and Creek warriors played major roles in procuring 
victories for the British. At Fort Picolata, these men launched a surprise night assault that carried 
the garrison within a couple hours.220 At Fort Pupo, Ensign Hugh Mackay, Jr. and his Highland 
Rangers once again were at the forefront of the battle, this time acting as a diversion while 
elements of the Forty-Second Regiment positioned artillery pieces to bombard the fort.221 After a 
day-long struggle, the garrison at Fort Pupo surrendered. This action, according to Ivers, was an 
“effective harassment” of the Spanish forces.222 The Highland Rangers, who played a crucial 
role in these two battles, became the image of how the military and political leaders in Great 
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Britain, as well as the Board of Trustees for the establishment of Georgia, desired to conduct 
military operations against the Spanish. While British forces, whether regulars or provincials, 
had a history in fighting in difficult terrain and unfavorable conditions, the extreme recurring 
conditions the Highland militia and rangers faced, such as nearly-impassable swamps and 
marshes, unbearable heat and humidity during the spring and summer months (in addition to 
bitter cold in the winter), and swarms of insects and other potentially dangerous wildlife, not to 
mention a constant state of alarm for counter-raid operations by the Spanish and their Native 
American allies, one sees that these men were placed into some of the most hazardous situations 
possible during this war.223 
The Highland Rangers and Highland Independent Company continued to suffer as the 
campaign wore on. In early May 1740, Lieutenant Robert McPherson of the Highland Rangers 
patrolled the area around Darien, searching for any signs of the enemy and waiting on promised 
reinforcements from South Carolina that would never arrive.224 A few weeks later, elements of 
the Highland Independent Company and the Forty-Second Regiment, composed more of 
Highlanders, were ambushed by a party of Yemassee warriors while on a supply run for British 
troops occupying Fort Diego.225 General Oglethorpe desired to use the Highland Independent 
Company extensively when on reconnoitering movements in Florida. For example, Oglethorpe 
deployed nearly five hundred men in his attempt to secure Fort Diego from a possible attack by 
the Spanish. The force stopped just short of the fort; General Oglethorpe decided to press on with 
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a guard provided by the Highland Independent Company.226 They soon discovered that the raid 
was a false alarm, and that Fort Diego was in no immediate danger. While on one particular 
scouting mission, Oglethorpe, along with commanders of some of the detachments under his 
command and accompanied by soldiers from the Highland Independent Company and British-
allied Indians, gathered intelligence from Point Quartell, a distance from Saint Augustine of just 
over a mile.227 Oglethorpe and the officers were on horseback, and rode at such a fast pace that 
the Indians had enough and left, while the Highlanders continued to maintain contact with the 
mounted officers through stifling heat and difficult sandy beaches.228 The next major 
engagement at Fort Mosa would cost the Highlanders dearly and place the entire British invasion 
in jeopardy. 
 
Ambush at Fort Mosa 
 
While General Oglethorpe planned his siege of Saint Augustine, he ordered a “flying 
column” of Highlanders (infantry and rangers), a company from the regiment sent by South 
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Carolina, and allied Indians to deploy and occupy Fort Mosa, a position within two miles of 
Saint Augustine on June 10; the majority of the force was composed of Highlanders.229 From the 
beginning, there was a rift in relations between those from the Anglicized colony of South 
Carolina and those from the predominantly-Scottish colony of Georgia. Colonel William Palmer, 
commander of the South Carolinians, fought almost constantly with John Mohr Mackintosh and 
Hugh Mackay, commanders of the detachments from the Highland Independent Company and 
Highland Rangers and his ranking seniors.230 One of the first disputes the commanders had with 
each other was the positioning of troops at the fort. Palmer wanted the force to set up camp 
outside the fort so that in the event of an attack, Palmer could deploy his men in a manner 
advantageous to him.231 Mackintosh and Mackay preferred to billet their men inside the old fort, 
and began immediate preparations to do so, while Palmer went off into the adjacent woods and 
set up camp with his South Carolinians.232  
Another issue arose regarding the posting of sentries once the force had settled in. The 
result of this was inadequate security of the entire area, an important factor in the disaster about 
to befall the flying column.233 The Highlanders began to distrust the English and only took 
commands from Highland officers.234 Palmer feared that Oglethorpe had sent the force to Fort 
Mosa as a “sacrifice”; if anyone would be sacrificed, it was the Highlanders due to the fact that 
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the majority of the men present were of Scottish Highland origin.235 The in-fighting continued as 
Palmer desired to beat to arms at four in the morning daily, a routine detested by the Highland 
militiamen occupying the fort.236 Colonel Palmer went into the fort when no movement was seen 
“sometimes twice…to rouse the Men up, but they little regarded it.”237 Tensions were high 
throughout the first days the flying column bivouacked at Fort Mosa, and continued when the 
Spanish made their attack. 
In the early morning hours of June 15 word reached Palmer and his English Rangers that 
an enemy raiding party was approaching their position.238 Palmer attempted to rouse the 
Highlanders inside the fort, and encountered the usual difficulty in doing so. When Spanish 
troops became visible, an order was issued not to fire until ordered so; it was disregarded by 
Highland sentries posted around the fort.239 The Spanish forces split and attacked the fort from 
different sides, but the Highlanders inside and the English Rangers from without repulsed the 
Spanish.240 The position of the English Rangers was the safer of the moment, as the Spanish and 
their allies desired only to breach the walls of the fort.241 Shortly before daybreak, however, the 
Spanish concentrated their efforts and were able to clear the main gate.242 The British forces 
inside did their best to fight their way out of the fort; one report, however, claims several of the 
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officers and men from the Forty-Second Regiment and detachment of the company sent from 
South Carolina fled as the battle was just beginning.243  
The British force incurred a severe number of casualties while defending Fort Mosa. Of 
the Highlanders involved in the action, over half were killed or captured, the highest number of 
casualties amongst the different detachments amalgamated into the flying column.244 The 
devastating loss of life at Fort Mosa proved the most difficult for the Highland settlements in 
Georgia, particularly the severely-depopulated Darien.245 One colonist wrote he had no news to 
report other than “the number of widows are much increased at Darien by their husbands being 
killed or taken at the late expedition.”246 The incident at Fort Mosa and the resulting failed siege 
of St. Augustine forced General Oglethorpe to end the offensive operation against the Spanish 
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Much of time between the end of the British invasion of Spanish Florida and the Spanish 
offensive into Georgia in mid-1742 was spent placing blame on what caused such a dramatic 
failure. Many, including Oglethorpe himself, thought that if Oglethorpe was given more troops 
and allowed to carry out a proper siege of Saint Augustine, the British would have had no 
problem in taking all of Spanish Florida.248 In an accurate assessment of Oglethorpe’s character, 
Larry Ivers judged that Oglethorpe was ready to press his attack to Cuba if Parliament allowed 
him to do so.249 The most surprising assessment of the investigations that followed the failed 
invasion of Spanish Florida came from a committee designated within the Commons House of 
Assembly in South Carolina. Their conclusions lay the blame of defeat with General Oglethorpe, 
where the committee thought it foolish to dispatch a relatively small number of men with limited 
provisions and no reinforcements to garrison a strategic fort (Fort Mosa), while possibly giving 
up their location by sending small parties out to round up stray horses from the Spanish.250  
 A mutual animosity formed between members of the South Carolina Assembly and 
Oglethorpe. South Carolinians were furious over the bungled invasion, and demanded the return 
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of ₤2,000 loaned to Oglethorpe and promised no aid in future operations against the Spanish.251 
Less intense feelings were shared between Parliament and the Board of Trustees for the 
establishment of Georgia. An officer in the provincial militia, Lieutenant William Horton, 
begged Parliament for additional money and regular soldiers for the defense of the colony; 
Parliament ignored the request, yet agreed to it after the invasion was over.252 At the time, the 
British government attempted to scale back expenditures on defensive measures in Georgia and 
appropriated more funds to the escalating conflict in Europe. Perhaps Parliament was correct in 
its decision to allocate more funds for the forces on the Continent than in Georgia. However, 
Georgia was still essential for guarding the rest of the British colonies in North America, and 
served as a staging area for British incursions into Spanish Florida.  
 The cessation of major hostilities between Georgia and Florida between late-1740 and 
early-1742 allowed the trustees to rebuild Georgia. In April 1741 the Board of Trustees began 
another recruiting campaign in Scotland to acquire new colonists to replace those lost during the 
invasion into Florida and improve the local economy.253 Anthony Parker noted that the new 
wave of colonists, forty in all including twenty-five men, were to be used specifically for martial 
purposes, as they were outfitted with “a ‘Musquet’…flints, bullets, gunpowder, and cleaning 
supplies.”254 Between the arrival of the new Highland Gaels and the resuming of hostilities the 
following year, the colonists participated in the maintenance of fortifications along the southern 
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frontier, as well as training for possible future fighting with the Spanish. This allowed them to 
become accustomed to the military efforts required of those involved in the military campaigns 
in this theater of the War of the Austrian Succession. 
 Oglethorpe, after recovering from the disastrous campaign, set out to bolster the defense 
of Georgia. Once again, the Highlanders would be at the heart of security operations where boats 
piloted by one hundred men of the Highland Independent Company, as well as two troops of 
rangers, became a crucial force in patrolling the southern frontier.255 Despite an unsteady 
economy to support his military endeavors, Oglethorpe necessitated the deployment of troops on 
the frontiers, and made use of the new wave of colonists for this purpose.256 The Highlanders, by 
Oglethorpe’s design, were to maintain a constant patrol of the border with Spanish Florida. This 
was proven detrimental to those Highlanders ordered to do so prior to the declaration of war in 
1739. The Highland militia units and ranger troops stationed in garrisons on the southern frontier 
during that time quickly became exhausted, and in certain cases mutinous, due to constant 
patrols, incessant alarms, lack of supplies, and poor living conditions. The situation was the same 
in May 1742, when Oglethorpe assessed that Darien was in good condition despite some 
grievances amongst the colonists.257 These were in regards to how the Highlanders in Darien and 
colonists in other towns were kept on the alert for Spanish incursions, as well as enduring attacks 
by Spanish who managed to slip past the security net.  
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The Spanish Invasion of Georgia 
 
 In late October 1741 the Spanish began to develop a planned invasion of their own, under 
the control of the governor of Cuba Juan Francisco de Güemes y Horcasitas and commanded by 
the governor of Spanish Florida Manuel de Montiano.258 Once assembled, the Spanish fleet 
sailed for Georgia in mid-June 1742. The forces of Georgia and South Carolina were still 
reorganizing after their defeat in 1740, and relations between Oglethorpe and the South 
Carolinians had not fully improved. Prior to the sailing of the Spanish fleet, Oglethorpe had less 
than one thousand men at his command, with most of them dispersed amongst several outposts 
along the border with Spanish Florida, to defend against a Spanish force of 2,000 to 3,000 
men.259 An order was received in Darien for the immediate dispatch of the Highland Independent 
Company to assemble in Saint Simons Sound, the eventual landing place of the Spanish invasion 
force.260 As the Spanish fleet approached, they attempted to pass through and land the soldiers 
on Amelia Island, but British artillery firing from Fort William prevented this.261 Governor 
Montiano then chose a spot just over a mile from Fort Saint Simons, and disembarked his force 
there on the evening of July 5.262  
 Oglethorpe quickly gathered a guard of men from, not surprisingly, the Highland 
Independent Company, rangers, and allied Indians and began to scout the Spanish positions.263 
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Montiano had to move fast if he was to retain the initiative and achieve victory against the 
British opposing forces around him. He moved much of his men out of the landing area and 
began searching for the large British formation thought to be in the vicinity. The Spanish spent 
most of July 6 occupied in establishing their beachhead and launching patrols to locate the 
British. Oglethorpe chose to deploy his forces in the woods surrounding the Spanish positions, a 
tactic he thought necessary to keep the Spanish from forming ranks in open fields and fighting 
pitched battles.264 This strategy became important as the British prepared to strike the following 
day. 
 On the morning of July 7, word of movement by enemy forces prompted Oglethorpe to 
gather troops in the immediate area to halt the Spanish advance “in the defiles of the woods 
before they could…form in the open grounds.”265 The majority of his force consisted of rangers, 
a few allied Indians, a company from the Forty-Second Regiment, and the Highland Independent 
Company.266 The Highlanders were the only ones ready to move out at the time, and were 
immediately deployed in the woods to monitor the Spanish.267 During the first part of the battle, 
Oglethorpe led a charge of the Indians and Highlanders against the Spanish as they moved closer 
to the woods.268 The attack forced the Spanish to retreat with the British in close pursuit. The 
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Spaniards, accompanied by around two hundred grenadiers, regrouped and marched down a 
small road surrounded by woods, wary of another attack by the British forces.269 The order to 
open fire was given as the Spanish grenadiers approached the British who were hidden behind 
piles of logs and thick brush.270 The Spanish returned a disciplined fire, and soon units of the 
British command, almost exclusively those from the Forty-Second Regiment, began to fall 
back.271 The Highlanders, however, held their position despite the fact that they were in a 
position to be outflanked once the English soldiers of the Forty-Second led by Captain Raymond 
Demere fled, in part because of the conditions on the battlefield (dense wooded terrain and thick 
smoke from the firefight) allowed for such confusion to occur.272 The British position held with 
only the company of Highlanders under the command of Lieutenant Charles Mackay along with 
the single remaining platoon of fifteen men from the Forty-Second Regiment.273 The fierce 
firefight continued for about an hour before the Spanish retreated back to their camp, the British 
following closely behind. Oglethorpe desired to annihilate the Spanish before they could board 
their ships in Saint Simon’s Sound. On July 12, he gathered the Highland Independent Company 
along with elements of the Fort-Second Regiment and rangers and prepared to attack, yet before 
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the assault commenced, a stray shot from one of Oglethorpe’s men alerted the Spanish and cost 
the British the element of surprise.274 
 The victory at what became known as the Battle of Bloody Marsh effectively ended the 
Spanish invasion of Georgia and turned the tide of the war in favor of the British.275 Credit for 
the triumph over the Spanish was and is given to Oglethorpe by leading contemporary figures 
and modern historians alike.276 While European soldiers of this period needed officers to lead 
them, to dispense orders and maintain cohesion in the chaos of combat, the true victor of the 
battle, the common soldier, is lost. In this case, the efforts of Oglethorpe are lauded more than 
those of the Highlanders who held the Spanish at bay from overtaking the British position. 
Recent scholarship, such as the work compiled by Anthony Parker on the settlement of Darien, 
begins to place the credit for the British triumph with the common soldier, specifically the 
Highlanders from said settlement. 
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Conclusion of the War 
 
 The Spanish invasion of Georgia was the last major event of the War of Jenkins’ Ear: 
threats of similar attacks were issued by both sides, but nothing materialized from them.277 
Frequent skirmishes between British and Spanish forces in the south and French to the west and 
southwest occurred that kept the civilian population on the alert for the duration of the war.278 In 
March 1743, General Oglethorpe led an expedition against the Spanish at Saint Augustine, but 
failed to achieve success due to detrimental weather and severe ailments amongst the soldiers.279 
As always, the Highlanders of the Highland Independent Company and ranger troops played a 
crucial role in the defense of the colony.280 After some time, however, the Highland Independent 
Company could only muster half its necessary strength due to a lack of willing participants 
amongst the Highland population and few new colonists to Georgia.281 This was supplemented in 
late 1743 with the arrival of thirty Highlanders of the nascent Royal Highland Regiment of Foot 
(The Black Watch).282 When the ’Forty-Five Rebellion broke out in the Scottish Highlands, the 
business of patrolling the southern frontier of British territory in North America occupied most 
of the colonists’ time and efforts.283  
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 In mid-1747, after much deliberation, the War Office in London decided to disband the 
Highland Independent Company, most of the ranger troops, and nearly all sailors who monitored 
the numerous streams and waterways in Georgia and northern Spanish Florida, an act that 
stunned the colonists who perpetually feared another Spanish incursion.284 This action placed the 
Georgians, as well as South Carolinians, in a difficult position, as they did not have enough men 
and resources to maintain a proper defensive posture on their borders with the Spanish and 
French. Without adequate troops to guard the frontier, a good portion of British territory in 
southern North America was in jeopardy. What had once been an overwhelmingly militarized 
colony was reduced to a few ranger and militia units to fight against the stronger Spanish forces 
and their Native American allies. Fortunately for the Highlanders, peace was declared between 
Spain and Great Britain the following year in October 1748, and soon after became a royal 
colony.285 It was the first time since early 1736 that the Highlanders could live at ease and not 
worry about the possible threat of invasion or fight off the Spanish or their allies in one of the 
numerous skirmishes that occurred during the War of Jenkins’ Ear. 
 The time when Georgia was a militarized border between British territory in North 
America and Spanish Florida took its toll on the Highlanders who participated in defending the 
frontier. The stress of maintaining a constant defensive posture and absorbing the impact of raids 
and other unconventional attacks by the Spanish and allied Indians had a severe detrimental 
affect of the progress of the colony itself, particularly its struggling economy. The Highland 
colonists voiced their concerns over their deplorable living conditions, where more time was 
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devoted to security operations on the border with Florida than farming. Several Highland 
colonists left Georgia for the relative safety of South Carolina, or returned to the Scottish 
Highlands to take part in the ’Forty-Five or post-’Forty-Five peace initiatives.286 What the 
Highlanders faced in Georgia was what the English thought the Highlanders were exposed to in 
the supposed wild and uncivilized country of the Scottish Highlands.287 According to English 
stereotypical opinions, the Highlanders were natural warriors suited for the type of 
unconventional warfare experienced during the War of Jenkins’ Ear in Georgia and Florida, a 
possible indication of the effects the ’Fifteen had on the martial identity of the Scots Gaels when 
armed insurrection was associated with the Scottish Highlands.  
 The Highlanders saw much action, whether manning garrisons near Spanish-occupied 
territory or on the battlefield, while deployed during the War of Jenkins’ Ear. Governor James 
Oglethorpe, commander of all British forces, made frequent use of the Highland Independent 
Company and Highland Rangers, including similar militia units gathered from communities in 
central and southern Georgia. Military service proved necessary for provincial units and those 
enlisted in the regular forces if the British were to solidify their position in North America, 
including the southern border with Spanish Florida, and those Highland colonists that served in 
the militia units lived up to their original designation as militarized yeomen. 
  As demonstrated with this case study, the experience of Scottish Highlanders who served 
in defense of the southern frontier of British-occupied land in North America fits the framework 
established in the previous chapter of how Highlanders were utilized for their inherent martial 
                                                 
286 Parker, Scottish Highlanders in Colonial Georgia, 95-96. 
287Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 56; Devine, Scotland’s Empire, 308; Plank, Rebellion and Savagery, 3-4, 
10-13; Whatley and Patrick, The Scots and the Union, 1-2 
 82
abilities in the defense and expansion of the British Empire. The Highlanders recruited for 
colonization efforts in Georgia were not highly-skilled warriors, a concept contrary to popular 
English mythology.288 In reality, the Highlanders had to adapt to conditions in Georgia, not only 
in developing communities but on the battlefield as well, something previous colonists failed to 
accomplish. This was a difficult task to overcome, as is seen in the eyewitness accounts of 
civilian and military life provided by some of the Highland colonists and the Trustees and 
officials in the British government. The certain instances, the Highlanders paid a heavier price 
for their efforts than did their English counterparts while the British were engaged in war and 
colonization in Georgia, particularly during the years of the trusteeship.  
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CHAPTER 4:  CONCLUSION 
 
Throughout the period of military endeavors that drew upon the manpower of the nations 
of Great Britain between 1739 and 1815 to fill the ranks of the British armed forces, one 
particular group, the Scottish Highlanders, were deployed in large numbers during the several 
wars of this period. Indeed, the act of employing such men in disproportionate numbers for 
service on the frontiers of imperial territory, combating enemy troops the Highlanders were 
thought to be naturally capable of defeating in battle, demonstrates the mindset of those in the 
British government and military who were desperate to remove the Jacobite threat from Britain. 
This threat became a problem in relations between Scotland and England as both sides began to 
negotiate a political union. 
The Act of Union in 1707 not only created one British government, but effectively 
established the British army, composed of men from England, Wales, Scotland, and parts of 
Ireland. Sharing the experience of warfare and empire-building were, according to some 
historians, key in solidifying the relationship between the nations of Great Britain.289 Since the 
restoration of the monarchy in 1660, the need for a standing Scottish army declined, in part due 
to the economic strife in the country, which in turn diminished the image of Scotland as a 
reservoir of men for military use.290 There was, however, a strong demand for men to fight in 
armies on continental Europe, and men from all nations in the British Isles answered the call. It 
was here that Englishmen and Scotsmen fought together as mercenaries, both gaining valuable 
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experience for the next threat to Great Britain: the House of Stewart’s attempt to reclaim the 
British throne. 
The Scottish Highlands, however, became a problem in the development of relations 
between Scotland and England. There was mutual resentment against the Act of Union of 1707 
which provided the Jacobites in Scotland and England with further cause to not only to 
overthrow the Hanoverian dynasty but to restore the Scottish legislature as well.291 The ’Fifteen 
and ’Forty-Five Rebellions, violent reactions in 1715 and 1745 to the House of Hanover that 
supported a restoration of the exiled Stuart dynasty, generated much disdain of the Highlanders 
amongst those loyal to the Hanoverians in both countries.292 Yet many Scots were not in favor of 
restoring the Stuarts to the throne, and saw better opportunities within the union of Great Britain 
under a Hanoverian monarch.293 The Jacobite rebellions, particularly the ’Fifteen and ’Forty-
Five, did more to tarnish the image of all Scots, as they were contrived as militant Jacobites by 
English propaganda.294 The Scottish Highlanders had to prove their loyalty to the British 
Parliament and the House of Hanover; one option was to utilize the Highlander’s supposed 
natural superiority as warriors, a construct developed by the English during the uprisings in the 
early- and mid-eighteenth century, to develop and secure loyalty to the British government, as 
well as quelling any rebellious activity in the region.295 Many agree that the Scottish Highlanders 
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finally became integrated into the British state after participating in several global conflicts in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, particularly after the colonization process of “Anglicizing” 
the Highlands was complete.296 However, recent scholarship seems to reject this idea, resulting 
in a shift in the correct direction of where future inquiry into this topic should be focused. 
 Revisionist opinion on the contribution of the Scottish Highlands to the British military 
deconstructs the positive outlook military service had on the Scottish Gaels and focuses on the 
detrimental effects of martial life on not only the Highlanders themselves, but later images of the 
Highlands (indeed, all of Scotland) and the strong Scottish nationalist identity that persisted 
despite the idea of sharing a larger British identity with the rest of the British Isles.297 The 
retention of a Scottish national identity despite efforts to create one British identity is 
demonstrated with the case study on Highland provincial units in the War of Jenkins’ Ear. 
Instead of forging a British identity in the process of bolstering the British Empire, the sub-
nationalities of Scotland and England are developed throughout the war. This proved dangerous 
as the combined forces from South Carolina and Georgia fought off the invading Spanish forces. 
Yet, service in the British military allowed the Highlanders to prove their loyalty to the British 
government, in addition to having returned to them cultural objects lost after the ’Forty-Five;  the 
Scots Gaels, including those in the army and those at home in Scotland, paid a heavy price for 
the return of such objects. Stana Nenadic argues that expanding and defending the British 
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Empire had a “socially and culturally disruptive” impact on many Highland families.298 Many 
Highland officers went to great lengths to prove themselves equal to their English counterparts, 
and in doing so squandered family fortunes, abandoned large estates for long periods of service 
abroad, and often met an untimely death. This is applicable to what many common Highland 
soldiers experienced when fighting to establish their “Britishness” and participate in “defence 
patriotism.”299 
 The British army incorporated significant numbers of Scottish Highlanders, nearly sixty 
Highland units in all, for service at home and abroad between the Seven Years’ War and the end 
of the Napoleonic Wars.300 Scottish, particularly Highland, regiments accounted for sixteen per 
cent of the total land force raised during the Seven Years’ War, not to mention Scots composing 
nearly a third of the officer corps. 301 Thomas Devine wondered why so many would enlist a 
decade after the violent repression of the Jacobites during and after the ’Forty-Five, arguing that 
given a martial identity before the ’Fifteen and ’Forty-Five was almost non-existent in the 
Highlands, these and other smaller insurrections in the region gave rise to this image where 
“Gaeldom became even more militarized than in the past.”302 The objective of the British 
government was to eradicate all substantial threats to itself by enlisting the Highlanders in the 
British army in record numbers in order to stabilize northern and eastern Scotland and utilize a 
new pool of recruits thought to be experts in the type of warfare needed to consolidate the 
Empire. 
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 Once a pattern of recruitment was established, the British government was able to drain 
more manpower out of the Highlands and into service across the Empire. This was certainly the 
case once a call to arms was put out during the American War of Independence and the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.303 The contribution of the Scottish Highlander to the 
defense of the British Isles and its Empire allowed for their image as rebellious savages bent on 
the destruction of the British state to be reformed into that of a loyal citizenry ready to be called 
upon in service of their nation. As Andrew Mackillop argued, this was “the replacement of a 
hostile stereotype with a positive one, but a stereotype nonetheless.”304 The result of this was a 
severely-depopulated Scottish Highlands in the nineteenth century, coming at a time when a new 
wave of foreign wars threatened the stability of Britain’s overseas possessions.305 The 
development of the Scottish Highlander as a martial race thus had its origins in the bloody 
conflicts between Jacobite supporters of the House of Stuart and the British government, 
providing further insight into why the Highland Gaels became the stereotypical image of British 
prowess in battle. However, as argued above, it was the participation of the Scottish Highlander 
in the War of Jenkins’ Ear, which began a pattern of martial usage of the Scots Gaels to be 
copied in the larger wars of the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
The North American theater of the War of the Austrian Succession, fought primarily in 
British-occupied Georgia and Spanish Florida, provides an early example of Scottish Highland 
participation in the British military system. The colony of Georgia was established primarily to 
relieve the burden of the South Carolinians who were under pressure to maintain patrols against 
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the Spanish and their allies. Within the first six years of the colony’s existence, the Georgia 
colonists, in particular the Highlanders, encountered numerous difficulties not only in attempting 
to establish a means of living, but in creating an effective defense system against enemy 
incursions as well. The governor and overall commander of the armed forces for the defense of 
Georgia, General James Oglethorpe, forced the Highlanders to make extreme sacrifices in the 
early years of the colonization of Georgia. While the colonization process was by no means 
meant to be easy, Oglethorpe singled out the Highlanders time and again for some of the more 
difficult assignments, particularly those relating to the defensive system.  
 In securing the colony’s southern border, a series of fortified outposts were established 
between 1736 and 1739 with many, including the southern-most fort on Cumberland Island, 
defended by Highland militia units or detachments of the Highland Rangers.306 As noted earlier, 
the Highlanders were armed with inadequate muskets at first, having either to purchase better 
arms or rely on their broadswords and targets. Much time and effort was spent patrolling 
southern Georgia and northern Florida to identify any threats against British-occupied land. The 
placement of Scottish Highland militia on the frontier of British-occupied territory in North 
America concurred with doctrine of the time, where the Highlanders were thought to be 
experienced in the type of unconventional warfare experienced in this part of the Empire.  
 When war broke out between Great Britain and Spain in late-1739, Georgia was put on 
full alert in anticipation of larger raids by the Spanish. To counter this, Oglethorpe conducted his 
own incursions into Spanish Florida, with the Highland militia and ranger units at the forefront. 
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Indeed, the first casualties after the official commencement of hostilities were two unarmed 
Highland militiamen stationed on Amelia Island. Within the first two months of 1740, 
Oglethorpe gathered an army composed of provincial units from South Carolina and Georgia, as 
well as the recently-arrived regular Forty-Second Regiment, and led an expedition to capture the 
heart of Spanish rule in Florida, St. Augustine. The Highlanders became a bodyguard for 
Oglethorpe, who surrounded himself with them when scouting possible enemy positions. One 
Highlander died of exhaustion as he and other Highlanders and allied Indians tried to keep up 
with the mounted general and his entourage when observing the Spanish in the Castillo de San 
Marcos.  
 The rout of British forces at Fort Mosa was the turning point of the invasion of Florida by 
General Oglethorpe. The “flying column” sent by Oglethorpe to this fort, a mere two miles from 
the main Spanish positions in St. Augustine, became embroiled in internal fighting amongst the 
officers in command. Arguments raged on issues such as overall command and where to bivouac 
the troops to provide maximum protection for the force. Highlanders Hugh Mackay and John 
Mackintosh, senior in rank to the Englishman William Palmer of South Carolina, wanted the 
column to establish a base within the fort, while Palmer preferred the open country, where the 
troops could form quickly in case of attack. Palmer also wanted to capture loose Spanish horses 
in the vicinity, an act that ultimately gave away their positions to observers in St. Augustine.307 
Prior to and after the defeat of the force by an early-morning attack conducted by the Spanish 
and their allied Indian forces a rift in relations had developed between the English South 
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Carolinian officers and the Highland officers of Georgia, which trickled down to the Highland 
militia who refused to follow orders from Colonel Palmer. This mutual distrust appears to go 
beyond one of opposing plans or squabbling amongst the officers, and conforms to the reality of 
Anglo-Scottish, especially Anglo-Highland, relations unfolding in Great Britain. While the 
column suffered needlessly due to poor coordination from General Oglethorpe, the presence of 
so many Highlanders must be seen as an attempt by Oglethorpe to deploy the Highlanders in a 
complicated reconnaissance mission as a way of utilizing their supposed superiority at 
conducting such operations.  
 When heavy fighting flared up in mid-1742, the Highlanders were once again put into a 
position where Oglethorpe took full advantage of their misunderstood martial capabilities. The 
Spanish invasion force that landed in Georgia met determined resistance from all British troops 
in the area. On July 6, General Oglethorpe led a party of Highlanders, regulars from the Forty-
Second Regiment, and Indians in an effort to scout the enemy positions and lure the Spanish into 
the woods where the British had a better chance of achieving victory if a battle occurred. The 
Highlanders played a pivotal role in defeating Spanish troops as they maneuvered through 
narrow paths and difficult terrain when an intense firefight broke out in what became known as 
the Battle of Bloody Marsh. Companies from the Forty-Second Regiment attached to the British 
force fell back, yet the Highlanders held their ground despite mounting casualties, an act that 
turned the tide of the battle in favor of the British.  
 The Battle of Bloody Marsh effectively ended the Spanish invasion, and while threats of 
similar incursions into British territory loomed over the southern British colonies, the warring 
sides chose to conduct smaller raids until the end of the war in 1748. As the war died down in the 
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North American theater, Parliament chose to cut back on military spending in the southern 
British colonies, particularly Georgia. This came as a shock to the colonists who feared the 
Spanish would take the opportunity to conquer Georgia. While years of war took its toll on the 
Highlanders in Georgia, the idea that they were now more vulnerable than ever to invasion 
seemed to create a greater sense of fear amongst the colonists.308 The demobilization of the 
Highland Independent Company and the Highland Rangers, two significant forces in the defense 
of the southern frontier, came at a time when relations back in Great Britain were strained after 
the defeat of Jacobite forces at the end of the ’Forty-Five Rebellion. While monetary issues were 
deciding factors in the decision to disband these provincial forces, this should not be taken out of 
the context of the Jacobite threat to the Hanoverian dynasty and all disarming acts that followed 
the failed uprising in Scotland. 
Given the case study presented in the third chapter, there was a period of 
misrepresentation of Highland manpower in the colony of Georgia during the War of Jenkins’ 
Ear that conforms to the analytical framework established in the second chapter. The 
Highlanders who participated in the fighting against the Spanish and their allies encountered 
extreme difficulties in attempting to secure the southern border of British territory in North 
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America. It was this kind of warfare, in many instances unconventional, experienced here that 
the British government thought the Scots Gaels were capable of countering. This theory was 
developed as a result of the failed Jacobite uprisings that occurred in the Scottish Highlands in 
the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries, and came to be stereotypically seen as a 
movement almost exclusively composed of Highlanders determined to restore an oppressive 
Catholic royal family. 
This study, however, presents only one example of how Scottish Highlanders were 
initially deployed in the British military system for a period of nine years. With the establishment 
of a pattern of martial misappropriation, new studies may be conducted on this subject. Thomas 
Devine made clear in his research the importance of further study of Scotland’s impact in the 
Royal Navy in the mid-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries in order to fully appreciate the 
role Scotland played in the expansion and defense of the British Empire at this time.309 Steve 
Murdoch and Andrew Mackillop asserted that, in terms of military service, Scots are examined 
primarily in an army role; the Highlanders are exclusively examined only in this capacity 
because of the iconic image of the Gaels in the army.310 More research must be conducted at the 
county level to gain sufficient knowledge of enlistment records and patterns to establish how 
Scots in general participated in the British military system within the context of English use of 
Scottish, specifically Highland, manpower.  
Employed in this study was a technique of reading against British, particularly English, 
discourse of officers and government officials on Scottish Highlanders. These sources provided a 
                                                 
309 Conway, “War and National Identity,” 876; Devine, Scotland’s Empire, 297-298. Conway demonstrated future 
problems associated with a study on Scotland’s naval contribution as there is no mention of where enlistees were 
born in Royal Navy recruiting records prior to 1765.  
310 Murdoch and Mackillop, “Introduction,” in Fighting for Identity, xxxv. 
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valuable look at English opinions of the Scots Gaels at the time, as well as a way of examining 
how the Highlander reacted to military service. These sources were used in this manner due to 
the lack of sufficient written material from the Highlanders, specifically those who were 
involved with the colonization of Georgia, as many of them were illiterate or could converse 
only in Gaelic. While the technique used here proved beneficial for this study, more archival 
research and translation of Gaelic sources will enhance the understanding of the Highland 
viewpoint on their contribution to the British military in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. 
This study predominantly approaches the subject of the misunderstanding of the martial 
capabilities of the Scottish Highlanders from the perspective of the Gaels themselves, utilizing 
British government and military sources to gain insight into how the English and the Scottish 
Highlanders viewed the deployment of Scots Gaels in the British army. It does not examine how 
the common English or Welsh soldier experienced warfare during this period. While their views 
on participating in the shared process of Britainization through warfare and defense of the 
Empire are important, their opinions were left out to focus more on how the Scottish Highlander 
perceived his role at this time, particularly while combating the Spanish in Georgia and Florida 
during the War of the Austrian Succession. Proper comparisons must be made in order to 
establish if Scots, specifically Highlanders, encountered more difficulties within the British 
military system than other nationalities. Once this and the afore-mentioned studies are completed 
will a stronger argument be made available to effectively counter assertions that military service 
was necessary and beneficial for Highlanders in the wake of the ’Fifteen and ’Forty-Five to show 
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loyalty to the British Parliament and monarchy as well as creating a new sense of “Britishness” 
within the realm of Great Britain and the Empire. 
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